Daily Report

Latin America

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Cuba

Alarcon To Sign Accord Banning Chemical Weapons

FL0601023493 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 6 Jan 93

[Text] Cuban Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon will sign an accord in Paris banning the use of chemical weapons. Alarcon will travel to Madrid on Monday [11 January] to participate in the Latin American Foreign Ministers Summit, and from there will travel to Paris. According to PRENSA LATINA, aside from the summit, Ricardo Alarcon will meet with Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana. Alarcon will also meet with representatives of organizations that give solidarity support to Cuba.

In Paris, in addition to signing the accord, Alarcon will hold meetings with representatives of the French Government with whom he will discuss the strengthening of bilateral ties.

Castro Interviewed at Revolution Square

FL0501143593 Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Networks in Spanish 0200 GMT 1 Jan 93

[Interview with President Fidel Castro by Hector Rodriguez and Soledad Cruz at Revolution Square in Havana on 31 December—recorded]

[Text] [Rodriguez] We are going to have an extremely pleasant visit here on our "Today" [Hoy Mismo] program with our Commander in Chief Fidel Castro.

[Castro] Hello, how are you?

[Rodriguez] The "Today" program is honored by your presence. I congratulate you, and we would like, Commander, to....

[Castro, interrupting] You have it all organized here?

[Rodriguez] Yes, we had it all organized. If you will be so kind as to have a seat here?

[Castro] I thought you were going to be very busy.

[Rodriguez] Yes, well, Commander, today has been a beautiful day, here at this "Yes To Cuba" rally held to see the year out. Soledad was saying that it has truly been a good night for (?many).

[Cruz] Good. What I call a good night, right? And what has tonight been like for you?

[Castro] Well, for me it has been a really marvelous night. Marvelous is the right word.

[Rodriguez] A night with so many nuances, giving a very big "Yes" to the Revolution, really.

[Castro] Do you know what I was thinking? That really, if today had not been rainy all day like it was, there would not have been enough room in this square to hold all the people who would have come.

[Cruz] Yes. That's right.

[Rodriguez] Right, that is true. It has been raining since dawn.

[Castro] I was impressed, at seeing how big the crowd was, and how densely packed. All day, I have been thinking: What a shame that, after all the efforts they have made to organize that concert, now the rain is going to come and mess it up.

[Rodriguez] Do not worry. Now it has cleared up at night.

[Castro] At the end, it has been a bit better [words indistinct]. Besides, these downpours (?that we have had) had not been forecast.

[Cruz] They were a surprise. It seems like there has been some bad weather around, or something like that. But of course, no bad weather can stop us.

[Castro] I was able to see some weather reports, and I think it is a cold wave that is almost covering the island, over the eastern region. There is an area of very heavy clouds near the eastern region, moving west.

[Rodriguez] (?So it is bringing) rain.

[Castro] Toward the north, there is an area....[rephrases] Toward the northwest, that cloudy area has high pressures. They say that sometimes clouds full of rain would pass. That is why we have been seeing showers throughout the day.

[Rodriguez] Yes.

[Castro] I heard the rain last night, in the predawn hours.

[Rodriguez] It started to rain shortly after 0300.

[Castro] So, I thought: Maybe tomorrow (?the weather will be better). We were worried not only about the ceremony but also about agriculture, which has to finish planting (?tobacco) [words indistinct] also cloudy and rainy. The sun would peep out now and then. I would say: Well, the weather is going to clear up. But it did not.

[Rodriguez] It would clear up and then go back to what it was before.

[Castro] So a complicated situation arose, maybe. Although it hurt this mobilization to a certain extent. That is why I was saying that, had it not been for these rains, it would have been....[pauses] Because I know people who had been planning to come with their families but who did not come in order to avoid the rain, to avoid getting wet and so forth.

[Cruz] Nevertheless, the square was packed with people all day. We, the entire "Today" team, made a tour of the

area in the afternoon, and there were....[pauses] Under a tremendous downpour, the number of people present was incredible.

[Castro] A heavy downpour?

[Cruz] Very, very heavy.

[Rodriguez] Heavy, there was a heavy one in the afternoon.

[Cruz] Well, I do not know how much time we are going to have, how much time you are going to give us. [laughs]

[Castro] I leave that to you. You take as much time as you like [words indistinct].

[Rodriguez] But today is 31 December.

[Cruz] Today is already 31 December, the last day of the year.

[Rodriguez] At the beginning of the year, or at the end of last year, I read the cables, those predicting that we would not make it.

[Castro] It is 31 December here, but there are some areas of the Pacific where it is not yet 31 December.

[Rodriguez] Yes, well, in the Pacific....

[Castro, interrupting] The other day I brought up a problem in the paper, but I was finally given a public solution. I told them I had been thinking about the trip Carlos Lage made to China, and the reports he sent, and I said that if someone travels east on Monday, they can arrive on Sunday.

[Rodriguez] On Sunday.

[Castro] Traveling east, they can arrive on Sunday. That is, they can leave China on a Monday, and depending on how fast they travel, they could arrive in our hemisphere on a Sunday. When it was 0015 in China, it was 1215 here.

[Cruz] It is true there is a tremendous contrast in China, exactly one day...

[Castro, interrupting] But you did not know one could travel back in time?

[Cruz] I did not know. But I felt it, because everything was so different. Everything was backwards, bedtime, everything was backwards, with twelve hours' difference. We would like to take advantage of this privilege....

[Castro, interrupting] Of course you want to take advantage, this is....

[Cruz, interrupting] This tremendous privilege for us....

[Castro, interrupting] I had thought that you would want to do....

[Cruz, interrupting] For those of us who work on the "Today" program, and we also know that the viewers are going to be very, very interested in this, in you giving us....

[Castro, interrupting] The viewers are sleeping.

[Cruz] No, do not think that. The viewers are still there. As soon as they saw we were in network and that we were going to continue, I am sure they thought something was going to happen. I am sure, because our viewers are tremendous. We announced this ahead of time.

[Castro] I was able to get away from the ceremony, but I could not get away from you.

[Cruz] Well, we would like a brief summary of this year, from your point of view, from your heart.

[Castro] But does that seem like so little to you? I heard you asking [Juan] Contino if I would be with you at 1930. I was in my office, I turned on my television and saw you were doing a number of interviews. You interviewed Contino, and you asked him for a summary. Do you think that it is so easy to summarize one year like that in a matter of seconds?

[Cruz] Well then, from your point of view, from your heart, your feelings, what were the most important things about this year?

[Castro] There are really so many that I would have to [word indistinct], but I would say in the first place that this has been a year of extraordinary merit for our people, a glorious, heroic year because of all the problems and difficulties we have had. I would say this has been one of the most extraordinary years of the Revolution because the tests we have had to undergo have been harder than ever before and the year is passing.

[Rodriguez] It is 31 December.

[Castro] It is already 31 December. Very important things we have.... [pauses] All kinds of very important things have happened this year. I mean, our sugar harvest was a heroic feat, the conditions in which we produced 7 million tons of sugar. It was a heroic feat for our people with the great resource shortages, having gone through the year with the shortages of resources, especially fuel and energy, with less than 50 percent of the energy we traditionally had. Despite this we have maintained order. We are still organized. We have maintained this organization. We are not in chaos. Not one school, hospital, or family doctor's office has been closed. I think these are really extraordinary things.

I would say that on the national level there was the challenge of the elections. To me, this is one of the biggest tests a political process can undergo, this test of elections which we are going through, with the two days of elections at the base level, on 20 and 27 December. I think no other country in the world, under conditions like those in Cuba, with the problems Cuba is having, would have undertaken this test.

[Cruz] That is true.

[Castro] I said this in the National Assembly and I am completely convinced of this. I think what is happening is an extraordinary thing. There are many things on the national level. I will not try to talk about all of them. On the international level, I would say one of the most important things was the Rio Summit, because it was an all-inclusive event, a truly worldwide raising of consciousness about the problems we have with the environment and the dangers threatening humanity. I think Cuba s role there was outstanding. I think I had never seen before, at any international event, the support for Cuba there, the recognition of Cuba that I saw at that event. If I were to single out an outstanding international event in which the world's attitude toward Cuba was reflected, expressed there through the representatives of all the nations that participated, that was one of the most noteworthy events. On the international level, I would also mention the battle against the embargo in the United Nations.

[Cruz] Yes.

[Rodriguez] The first defeat for the Americans, after the fall of socialism.

[Castro] It was incredible. In that situation, the results were better than expected. I would never have imagined that the United States would be as isolated as it was. It was a situation in which the world reacted. You do not even have to count the countries that voted in favor of the Cuban motion, but just those that abstained or those that walked out, that did not participate.

[Cruz] They did not want to commit themselves, but that gives (?them a voice).

[Castro] You must look at what it means for many countries to take a position of this kind at the United Nations, because the Americans keep track of all the delegations, what they do there, how they vote at the United Nations. But of course, it is always difficult to give a summary because a ton of things still need to be noted. We have not mentioned [words indistinct] for example, we have not mentioned the Olympics.

[Rodriguez] The Olympics.

[Castro] You are completely right.

[Cruz] And the number of cultural prizes given this year. There were a lot of them also, international music contests, the film festival, which I thought was magnificent. Because Hector and I have an ongoing argument about sports and culture.

[Castro] Sports and culture. But I thought that you got along so well!

[Rodriguez] Yes, we do.

[Cruz] Yes, it is a relationship of friendly disagreement, because he defends sports a lot, and I have to defend culture.

[Rodriguez] Because what happened in Barcelona had no precedent.

[Castro] But it would be worse if you started defending sports and he started defending culture.

[Cruz] We have divided it up well, then.

[Rodriguez] What a performance, though.

[Cruz] Of course, without a doubt, the Olympics were incredible.

[Castro] There is an extraordinary event I did not mention. It was said that because Cuba did not attend the two previous Olympic Games, we would be in a worse position. With two more medals, we would have placed ahead of China, and we lost two medals that we could have won. We lost by a hair, for example, in weight-lifting and in boxing when they did not treat us completely fairly in some of the decisions. We could have had 18 gold medals and finished in fourth place. That is going to be very difficult in the future because China has enormous potential in sports and they are developing it.

[Rodriguez] Cuba does as well.

[Castro] And we are also developing it.

[Rodriguez] We have great sports potential.

[Castro] If we are pointing things out, and if you ask me about something which is notable this year, it is the fact that even though we do not have the final figures, I am almost sure infant mortality dropped in 1992 in comparison to 1991. With the problems we have, this is truly extraordinary. I did not think we would be able to maintain the infant mortality rates that we have. In fact, the figures have gone down by a few tenths of a point, which is what I think probably happened. But I think we will have the exact figures in another three or four days.

[Rodriguez] It has been very difficult to reduce those rates, but it is much harder [words indistinct].

[Castro] It is difficult, but we are struggling to bring it below 10 [per 1,000 live births]. This is our historical struggle. Several provinces are below 10. Havana City is under 10, even though I understand—[Pedro] Chavez told me—that it went up a little bit this year, from 9.3 to 9.5. But I think Las Villas [Villa Clara Province] has less than seven.

[Rodriguez] There are also municipalities that have....

[Castro, interrupting] There are municipalities that have three or two. Imagine, the capital of the United States has a rate of 30 something, I think, according to some figures I saw not long ago. They have more than 30 for

ever, 1,000 live births in the capital of the United States. But the capital of Cuba, during the special period, has less than 10.

[Rodriguez] It is because we are an organized country.

[Cruz] Really, what we have achieved in the health sector is beyond argument. It is unmatched anywhere. It is something that no one can deny.

[Castro] The problem is to keep it at this level under these conditions.

[Cruz] That is what is truly extraordinary.

[Castro] Let me tell you something. I imagine that [words indistinct] you usually work a lot in general but I started watching you early.

[Rodriguez] Yes, we were here early.

[Castro] I saw you on television at approximately 1915.

[Cruz] Yes, I began at 1900. That is when the "Today" program begins.

[Castro] I wanted to know what was going on with the weather [words indistinct] in my office. I was able to see the Havana channel program, but when the Havana program ended, you began immediately.

[Cruz] Yes.

[Castro] Almost right away and early. How many hours has it been since then? From 1900 to almost 0100. It has been six hours. You have been working six hours.

[Cruz] We also worked in the afternoon, and the technicians have been working since yesterday, and they were here for the rehearsal.

[Rodriguez] For us, for me, for all our team it is an honor to have worked on a day like this.

[Cruz] Of course, and the day of the elections was another day when we also were very happy to work.

[Castro] Who was the other comrade who worked with you?

[Cruz] Rita Rosa.

[Castro] She said that she was finding people to interview.

[Cruz] Yes, Rita Rosa. She is on the other set. We were on top of some scaffolding and she stayed behind conducting the interviews and I came here. She is still conducting some more interviews.

[Castro] I was able to watch the whole show.

[Cruz] Yes, there was a (?video-bin) there.

[Castro] I would have liked to have been able to see it from the front, but I saw it through the video.

[Cruz] (?Video-bin).

[Castro] (?Video-bin) is what it is called?

[Rodriguez] (?Video-bin).

[Castro] You know more about these new things. I thought that it was excellent [words indistinct].

[Cruz] What good artists we have, right? How nice it is they are with us.

[Castro] Robertico [Robaina] was telling me about many of them because naturally I was not familiar with everyone. I know a large number of them. I have heard them, some more than others. Of course, they are very well known. Robertico introduced me to several new artists. He was explaining that most of them have emerged from the [fine arts] schools.

[Cruz] Yes. Our schools are....

[Castro, interrupting] They are of very high quality.

[Rodriguez] We are reaping the fruits of the fine arts schools, in music, and in everything.

[Castro] Yes, They told me about music, painting, and also literature.

[Rodriguez] We have developed fabulous potential.

[Castro] You see, he is talking about culture.

[Cruz] Yes, he is talking about culture.

[Rodriguez] Culture is in sports, in science, and we are an organized nation. This is why we have reached this moment despite everything that has happened.

[Cruz] And we will continue.

[Rodriguez] And we will continue.

[Castro] But you have been a great help with your program. I have confessed more than once that I am a follower and assiduous listener of this program, whenever I can. Unfortunately, I cannot always watch it, but whenever I can, I watch, part of it, the part that is before 2000, when I can, and then the interviews. I watch everything I can. Sometimes I have to do other things, but I keep checking. There is a lot of news. You give quite a bit of news. One can keep well informed. You analyze problems of great national interest, problems of different kinds. I think that as a new program, it has been extraordinarily successful, and I think this success can continue to grow, just as it is.

[Cruz] You are saying all this to us....

[Castro, interrupting] At least (?that is what I think) from my personal experience, because I have little time to watch television. Even so, I try to find as many minutes as possible to watch this program and see the news. I

realize what this program means and the great help it represents for the country at this time we are living through.

[Cruz] That sets a very high goal for us. You can be sure that all of us, absolutely all of us, will make the greatest effort every day so that you can feel proud of us, and so the people can as well.

[Castro] I have already told you this; it is nothing new. Besides what I have said publicly.

[Cruz] And [words indistinct] also. I have [words indistinct] comrades in television asked about Cuba Vision, and you have said: Well I like the news. Other people watch other programs, but I like the news. This gives us satisfaction and happiness.

[Castro] But normally when they record my remarks, Cuba Vision shows them first. Then they pass them to the "Today" program.

[Cruz] Well, we take turns.

[Castro] I have problems of conscience, because when I speak at length, for 40 minutes, I am taking all that time away from you. That really worries me. But today, with the problems with the electricity....

[Rodriguez, interrupting] And with the press.

[Castro] And with the written media, television fills an enormous vacuum. So, many people who cannot see it in the press or whom the press does not reach can see it on television at night. In addition, with the power outages, those who do not see a program of national interest—or of national necessity, we could say—one day, those who do not see it on Monday can see it on Tuesday. Imagine, you know I like sports, but I was worried when I saw that the "Today" program had to divide its time between baseball, the news, analyses, and all the things you do every day. Because our people like baseball a lot. Not all the games are equal. Look, by watching "Today" to see what news you are giving, I have started seeing baseball games again! I am more informed about what is going on with baseball, the hits, runs, and all those things and the condition of the....

[Cruz, interrupting] We are also going to broadcast boxing. We are going to broadcast other sports, not just baseball.

[Rodriguez] I think it was a wise decision, Tuesdays and Thursdays, or Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays....

[Castro, interrupting] I would have....[pauses] I do not know if it is true that....[pauses] The thing is that the different things compete, but it does not have a great political interest for your program, so no matter what is going on in baseball, baseball is outside that. It is a different activity, although it has a lot of fans. The programs are not the same every day, either. Of course, you have done another good thing. You have broadcast from Bayamo, Santiago, Holguin, and other places, and that is good because you have been able to choose and select. It seems this system of yours is successful. But I missed the program, because even though I am interested in sports, I am more interested in the nation's problems, the things you analyze, international problems. We must also congratulate Mendoza [not further identified]. I have seen some of his programs. He has worked....

[Cruz, interrupting] He has also been here.

[Castro] Yes, I saw him on the (?video-bin), right?

[Cruz] (?Video-bin).

[Rodriguez] [Words indistinct] today.

[Castro] But I did not hear him. His voice was not on. This was in the intermission before the program started, when the political rally ended and the other part started. I must explain about the political rally also. I would have liked to say something there, but I felt terrible thinking about the rain coming down, the people out there all day, how tired they must be, and if one starts speaking, one will speak for at least half an hour, 40 minutes, and that did not seem appropriate to me. So I waged a bit of a battle with the audience. I made my apologies so I would not repeat—and it was not really necessary for me to repeat—a speech [words indistinct]

[Rodriguez] What he said was very rousing.

[Cruz] What he said was very good.

[Castro] I was sorry, very sorry about it, for the people, because they asked me to and they asked me quite forcefully. Those are the contradictions one has. They make me speak almost everywhere, in spite of the fact that I always resist. But this ceremony was also more important, more significant. You cannot improvise a speech under those conditions, with that audience, at that time, with it threatening to rain, at a time when we must analyze closely everything we say.

[Cruz] Of course. But I think it was excellent, really. I think it was excellent, and the people took it well, and everything came out very well. What I would like now is for you to give us your predictions for 1993.

[Castro] Yes. I would have to almost be a prophet. But, you have already discussed quite a bit with Lage [words indistinct] that program. Before answering you, I should say, to finish talking about the program, that the program with Lage had an enormous audience and aroused a lot of interest.

[Rodriguez] I think people liked it.

[Castro] It was an excellent program. I should also say that on election day, you did excellent work also, on 20 December. The only thing was that someone made a mistake and instead of continuing with that, when many people had not yet voted, you went to baseball. I hope that on 24 February, you will not go to baseball, no

matter what the game is. This has tremendous strategic importance, this difficult battle that is being waged.

[Cruz] Well, in the midst of so much praise, some criticism is very good, to keep us on the mark. That is very good.

[Castro] You discussed that with Lage. He said 1993 would be difficult. In spite of the enormous efforts being made, 1993 will be difficult. It is always better to expect greater difficulties than to think we will have fewer difficulties. As a strategy, we must always expect the greatest difficulties. If we adapt our minds to something less difficult, we will not be prepared to endure these tests. I do not want to go into the reasoning at length. I have repeated it many times in recent days, and Lage mentioned it, but really we must make enormous efforts to meet all of our daily needs, from fuel to food and medicine.

Because a country which has almost 11 million inhabitants, more than 90 percent of whom have electricity; a country with so many social services of all kinds, which has schools, hospitals, research centers, and cold-storage centers; cannot do without electricity, and we are spending more than 40 percent of our income on fuel. It is not easy. We have some uncertainties in the coming year. We cannot base our hopes on the changes in the United States. We must wait. We must wait and observe closely everything that occurs in the United States and the world, because what occurs in the United States and the world affects us quite a bit. We must see what effect the famous Torricelli Law will have on our economic dealings, since one of the most difficult things we have to resolve is the question of shipping. That law is one-sided. It is aimed directly against our ability to (?lease ships) [words indistinct] to import. Sometimes even if we have the minimum amount of funds to import something, the problems are with the shipping. Because we also have to ship everything we bring here from more than 10,000 km away.

[Cruz] Very long distances.

[Castro] Perhaps the closest place is Canada.

[Rodriguez] Mexico.

[Castro] Well, of course, we import a few things from Mexico. It is the closest. You have seen the troubles the ship Pinar del Rio had. It almost sank. It was bringing the Pastors for Peace donation. Of a cargo of about 300 tons of steel, more than 100 tons were lost. There was a force 10 sea. It was one week late in arriving. You can see the problems with shipping. The ship that came from India traveled for 37 days, 20,000 km. But there are many ships that have to come from China, Vietnam, Korea, Japan, Europe, and Argentina. No one could predict yet for certain what the consequences of that law will be. It is the law in the United States. We must also see what the attitude of the new administration will be.

[Cruz] That was the question I wanted to ask. Could the new administration have a more benevolent attitude?

[Castro] It is very difficult to predict, and it is better not to get one's hopes up. Naturally, it cannot set a worse policy than the United States has followed. On the international level, and with respect to our country, it is impossible for it to set a worse policy. It could be said that the U.S. Government devotes itself almost entirely to Cuba. It would seem the administration works against Cuba alone. It would seem the entire U.S. diplomatic corps throughout the world was working against Cuba. As bad as the Torricelli Law is, the things they do outside the Torricelli Law are even worse. They are committed to hampering all of our economic dealings; sabotaging every effort we make in the international economic arena to develop our economy, develop joint enterprises; and sabotaging the economic opening we have made. With respect to foreign investments, and all the trade dealings Cuba conducts to buy or sell, to export our products, to obtain credit, to obtain anything, they conduct an implacable and systematic harassment against even the smallest effort made by Cuba.

[Cruz] It is because the challenge we represent hurts their pride.

[Castro] We are practically alone. All the billions they invested in subverting the socialist countries, and the resources—political power, economic power—that they devoted to this, is now allocated against us, at a time when there is a terrible crisis in the world and countries are under the control of international credit organizations to such an extent that they cannot make a move without serious consequences for their own interests. This is because they depend on the IMF, the World Bank, or other credit organizations. These countries are victims of pressure by the United States. In many cases they are not in a position, in objective terms, to resist that pressure. The United States exerts pressure not only against Third World countries, but also quite a bit of pressure against the developed countries. However, despite this, there was a strong reaction against the Torricelli Law. Yet, the world is not aware of the full extent of the embargo. The embargo has aspects which are much worse than the Torricelli Law; that is, this systematic and constant effort they make.

[Rodriguez] Including medicine and everything else.

[Castro] And everything else. For this reason it is better not to make any predictions yet. It is wiser to prepare for a hard and difficult year and to work even harder and better. This is where we must put our efforts. We must wage battles on the different fronts we have to fight on during the forthcoming period, and of course, we must maintain our presence of mind, spirit, and unity, the levels of unity of our people, party, mass organizations, and revolutionary institutions. We have a test ahead. It is a difficult battle; it is the National Assembly elections, which are of decisive importance. I have followed the consultation process very closely. What is happening

with the consultation process is truly impressive, and it is still going on. I believe that in the history of Cuba, such a process has never taken place in selecting the people who will become candidates to the National Assembly.

[Cruz] It has to be very extensive.

[Castro] And it is becoming even more extensive. They are holding new consultations. On 29 December they held new consultations. On 30 December, consultations were also held at the provincial level regarding cadres at the national level and cadres at the provincial level. Since the responsibility of the candidacy commission is very great, the size of the candidacy commission has tripled. The national commission is working, collecting information, from 0800 until 0000 or 0100, because this has been an extraordinary consultation process. It will be worthwhile to study this in depth at a later time. It will be worthwhile to report on everything that has been done in this regard, because I do not think it has any precedent in history. We ourselves did not have experience in this area. We are traveling down a new road, but I have seen the people work with an extraordinary amount of commitment and dedication in everything that concerns the upcoming elections for deputies, who are the fundamental branch of the state.

[Rodriguez] On 24 February.

[Castro] February 24 is a historic date. It is only two months away.

[Cruz] This means that on that day you cannot broadcast a baseball game.

[Castro] On that day I would at least like to turn on the television and see you talk about the problems of the elections and not about the game being three to one in the fifth inning, although some of us may be great sports fans.

[Rodriguez] No, at 0700 we will be on the air.

[Castro] I think you should remain there until the polling stations close and continue giving information. It was very interesting. I watched several of the interviews you did. I was watching you that day. I almost did not go to vote because I was watching your program. I arrived late because I was watching your program and your interviews. Luckily, during the baseball game, in between innings, you repeated some of the interviews. They were good interviews. There was Melba's [not further identified] interview; there was the interview with Melba's mother also. The interview with [Jesus] Montane's mother was also included. I think it was you who was doing the interviews.

[Cruz] Yes, thank you.

[Castro] I was listening to all this.

[Rodriguez] On that day we are going to....[pauses] It is not going to happen again. On that day we will begin at 0700 and we continue until the end.

[Castro] I did not know that you had a chair ready for me here.

[Rodriguez] It is an honor....

[Castro, interrupting] That you had a platform here, and that you were going to seat me here and subject me to an interrogation. At least I have also asked you several questions.

[Rodriguez] It is an honor to have said farewell to the year in your company.

[Castro] In this chair, I feel like the opposite of Jesus Christ.

[Cruz] Good. So you will want to send a New Year's message to the viewers of the "Today" program and all the Cuban people.

[Castro] I ask them for all the patriotism they are capable of, all the dignity they are capable of—which is a lot—and all the spirit of sacrifice they are capable of. I ask them to have confidence. I ask them to trust in the ultimate victory of the Revolution, which would never have been possible without that great amount of dignity, patriotism, sacrifice, and revolutionary spirit. This is what I ask from everyone on this 31 December, on the 34th anniversary [of the Revolution], which reminds me of the final days of the war, but I am not the best person to talk about this. Mendoza is the best person to talk about this. But I remember that on 31 December we were getting ready to attack Santiago de Cuba.

[Rodriguez] You were in Palma.

[Castro] On 1 January, our troop movements for attacking Santiago de Cuba began. We had a truly excellent plan. They had 5,000 soldiers, and we had 1,200, but we had never had as many soldiers as at that time. We already had the whole schedule, the whole plan. We were planning to take the city in six days. The experience gained during all those days prior to the victory gave us a certainty about how to do things. We were going to surround it battalion by battalion. I do not know if Mendoza knows all this, or if I have ever told this story, about where they had their main battalions. They had one at the airport, another battalion in Boniato, another in Quintero Hill. The bulk of the troops were at the Moncada Barracks—I remember it as if it was today—and the main buildings in the city were under their control. At this hour we had all our troops ready to surround one battalion first. We were going to surround each battalion with 300 soldiers to create a correlation of forces with the classic strategy of surrounding the units and fighting off the reinforcements. Therefore, the first day we were going to conduct a battle, and they were going to make an effort to rescue that surrounded unit. On the second day, a second battle. That would make two battles. Likewise on the third and fourth days. On the fourth day, four battles would be taking place against....[pauses] If there were four battalions. I believe I am missing one battalion, the one in El

Caney. They had a fourth battalion. On the fourth day they would be waging four battles within the city in an attempt to rescue their units, because no army can afford to leave a unit under siege. This would wear them down terribly. The units would be surrendering one by one. On the fifth day the city would rise up in arms. We were going to transport through the bay 100 guns of the 350 we had seized at Palma Soriano, in addition to the ones they already had. On the fifth day the city would rise up in arms. By the sixth day the city would have been taken. Thus, we should have taken the city on 6 January. That would be the great battle for Santiago de Cuba in which we were to use all the experience we had accumulated with a correlation of forces which might seem greatly in favor of the enemy—5,000 against 1,200. Those 1,200 would have taken the city. Anyhow, we are glad that battle never took place, that it is not in Cuba's history, because several dozen lives would have been lost, at least several dozens lives of our people, who survived when the collapse took place. Later, we took the city without firing a single shot.

[Rodriguez] Without firing a single shot, at 1800.

[Castro] The city was taken almost from the moment we called for a general strike, because we organized a quick attack on the city and gave orders to one column to advance while we publicly denounced the coup d'etat. We gave orders to all the troops and called for a general strike. I sent a column under Rene de los Santos to advance quickly along Central Highway to ask the [enemy] soldiers to surrender, the battalion located at Quintero Hill, and if they did not surrender to give them a brief period, a matter of minutes, to do so, and if they did not, to open fire. Because what we did not want was for the coup maneuver to consolidate, and we wanted the hostilities to break out immediately. So I began moving toward El Caney.

[Rodriguez] Time was of the essence.

[Castro] I moved toward El Caney also with a strong column, because we wanted to break the impasse immediately. But by the time I arrived at El Caney, there were already officers there wanting to negotiate with me. I asked them to gather the officers in charge of the Moncada Barracks at El Caney. Who would have predicted that five years, five months, and five days after the Moncada Barracks attack, I would be meeting in El Caney with the officers in charge of that powerful Santiago de Cuba army? I met with them.

Mendoza said yesterday or the day before—I was listening to him—that that is where the surrender took place. It is not correct to speak of surrender. I did not mention the word surrender to those officers.

[Rodriguez] What words did you use?

[Castro] If I had spoken of surrender, this could have hurt their honor or pride.

[Cruz] Of course.

[Castro] I asked them to disobey their orders. I explained to them that [General] Cantillo had reached an agreement with us and had betrayed that agreement, that the agreement had not been complied with. The agreement had been reached a few days earlier. He arrived by helicopter and met with me near Palma, I believe in the former Oriente Sugar Mill. I presented three conditions, because he insisted on returning to Havana. I told him to not go to Havana; that it was not necessary to go to Havana. I said: Carry out a mutiny among the Santiago de Cuba regiment and I guarantee you the regime will not last another 24 hours. I told him to mutiny with the support of our forces. Let's join forces.

I wanted to find an elegant solution, since he had come to negotiate. He acknowledged we had won the war, but how can we end it? I suggested to him how to end the war, but he insisted. I told him: Let's carry out a joint movement of the Santiago de Cuba military forces and our forces. We spoke many times with the military. We followed a policy of freeing absolutely every prisoner of war and treating the injured. Also, we fought them and caused many casualties. Because we conducted a very generous war, we had very great moral influence among the enemy troops.

I told him: Let us end it this way to spare as many honorable individuals among your ranks as we can. He agreed. I told him to not go to Havana, not to risk going to Havana. He told me it was safe, that he could go to Havana. I presented three conditions. First, there would be no coup d'etat in Havana. Second, Batista would not be allowed to flee. Third, there were to be no negotiations with the Yankee embassy. Those were the three conditions. Cantillo went to Havana and carried out, organized, precisely those three things: the coup in Havana, Batista's escape, and the talks with the U.S. Embassy [words indistinct] approximately around 30 December. We received news to wait, that there was good news. I said: What do you mean wait? We halted the military operations waiting for this movement, and we cannot halt the military operations.

[Rodriguez] When did you find out about the coup?

[Castro] Let me explain it to you. On 30 December I sent a letter to Rego Rubido telling him that after 31 December—I gave him a deadline, I do not remember exactly if it was 24 hours—if the agreement was not complied with, hostilities would break out again, and that once the fighting began it would not be stopped until Santiago de Cuba was taken. I told him we were going to attack the city. So on 1 January we were to begin, and we were in what today is the America Libre Sugar Mill, I think that is its name, the Contramaestre Mill, now the America Libre Mill. We were there in the mill's camp area. That is where we were sleeping. We were between Maffo, which we had just taken, and Palma, which we had taken a few days earlier. But we were there, preparing all the movements for the attack on Santiago de Cuba. At some point in the predawn hours, when the news began spreading, someone woke us up and said: Batista has

fled. Batista has escaped. Then we started hearing reports that a government junta had been formed; that a judge, whose name was, I think, Piedra [rock]....

[Rodriguez, interrupting] His last name.

[Castro] I think what was rock-like about him was really his nerve. We heard this man had been declared provisional president of the Republic, that there had been a coup in the capital. So I immediately went at full speed to Palma and I told Mendoza this. I went to the Radio Rebelde station. I instructed Camilo [Cienfuegos] and Che [Guevara] to continue the operations, and I instructed all columns everywhere to continue military operations, not to let up in any way, to initiate the hostilities, not to give anybody time to do anything.

We called for a general strike, and after the instructions to Camilo and Che to march on Havana, and to the entire population to join in with the general strike, we went to....[rephrases] we conducted this operation. But what was the exact time? We would have to pinpoint the time at which the radio stations began reporting the news, whether at 0300 or 0400 or 0500, because immediately, they woke us up in the predawn hours to tell us the news.

These are things, feelings one has. One has certain impressions. We saw the war was won, because I knew we could stop the coup. But there is something. One feels a sudden void. The first feeling one experiences is that of a terrible void. When one had been working at this for two years, and suddenly that scene changed completely. The war was over. That happened to me twice. Once was when we wound up the offensive, and I saw that was.-...[pauses] that we had....[rephrases] that victory was....

[Rodriguez, interrupting] When the battle of El Jigue was won?

[Castro] No, after the battle of El Jigue, when we destroyed their main units and forced them to withdraw 10,000 men. That was a fight between 300 men and 10,000! When the operations ended, we had 900 men. We had captured over 500 guns from them. We had 900 armed men. We had gotten them from the schools we had there for recruits, and we had armed them with the weapons we had seized during the offensive. Well, your questions have made me go back in time....

[Rodriguez, interrupting] But that story is very good!

[Castro] To that 31 December 1958, and you have made me take Mendoza's place here. Mendoza is the man....

[Cruz, interrupting] No, no! What a privilege!

[Rodriguez] What a privilege!

[Cruz] No, what a privilege it is to hear the story told by the main participants.

[Rodriguez] Because there are generations that must hear that story, which is so good and so beautiful.

[Cruz] On top of it, told by the main participants, by the principal participant. I think that is really a good gift.

[Castro] The thing is, we have a great debt to history, and to posterity and the people, because I have not written down all these experiences, all these things I am telling you about.

[Cruz] True. That is true.

[Castro] A lot of material has been gathered. Work has been done. Because I could not remember today on what day we visited such-and-such a farmer. Nevertheless, there are historians who have already been able to pinpoint all those facts, and they greatly facilitate the reconstruction of the story. But that story is a very interesting one. Well, that is what I remembered when we began talking about dates, and about that 31 December of 34 years ago.

[Rodriguez] Almost no time at all, right?

[Castro] We are talking about 31 December.

[Rodriguez] Yes.

[Castro] Of course, what day did we take Maffo? I think we took it on 30 December.

[Rodriguez] The battle of Maffo was [words indistinct].

[Castro] We had two armies: one in the front line and one in the rear. We had the Bayamo army as the rearguard, and the Santiago army as the vanguard. We occupied all the territory between Palma....[corrects himself] no, not Palma, between Bayamo and Santiago.

[Rodriguez] Santiago. Yes, that entire area.

[Castro] We were defending our rearguard on the river near Jiguani. But we had hit the Bayamo troops so hard—they had elite troops—during the Guisa battle, that the enemy now respected us. They did not counterattack. We established our defense positions on the river, and they did not counterattack any more. Meanwhile, we continue advancing toward Santiago de Cuba. We had two armies, one in front and the other behind. But during this time we were already blocking the retreat route of the Guantanamo army....[pauses] the Bayamo army, between Manzanillo and Bayamo. We had already severed communications between Camaguey and Oriente. We had surrounded 17,000 troops in Oriente Province.

[Rodriguez] The war was already won. It would have been very difficult....

[Castro, interrupting] We had the island divided in two with Che attacking Santa Clara while Camilo was really concluding the Yaguajay battle, which was delaying him. Sometimes, certain units put up heavy resistance, such as at Maffo. The troops at Maffo resisted for 20 days.

[Rodriguez] That was a battle....

[Castro, interrupting] But they were delaying our attack on Santiago, because we could have had the Bayamo troops on our rearguard, but we could not have a battalion surrounded there. This occupied some of our forces, and we needed their weapons for the Santiago de Cuba operation. This is why we took Palma first and Maffo second. But at Maffo they had dug tunnels underneath the pavement and filled them in with sand bags. There was nothing, it was almost impregnable [words indistinct].

[Cruz] That is it, let us extend an invitation to you to come to our studio. That is an outstanding debt.

[Castro] Mendoza is in the Academy of History, and what I can do is help him in some of these things.

[Cruz] It is an opportunity for you to visit the studio where we do the "Today" program, and we can talk about history on the air.

[Castro] I believe that Mendoza has been there several times.

[Cruz] He has his own weekly time slot.

[Castro] Well, allow me to congratulate you not only for your work, but for the contribution you have made during 1992, a very difficult period. I want to congratulate you for this and express my personal appreciation and the appreciation of every revolutionary for the work you have done. I wish you even more success in your work during 1993. I thank you for this pleasant and happy opportunity to remember the past.

[Rodriguez] I believe that it has been an outstanding....

[Castro, interrupting] This opportunity to talk to you.

[Rodriguez] We give you best wishes for the New Year. We need you to live a long life. We wish you very good health. We all need you. Therefore, our best wishes. The doors of the "Today" program are always open to you.

[Castro] I received your messages when I sent you a message through Lage telling you I watched the program and congratulating you [words indistinct] and your work team, to whom I sent not a written message but an oral message.

[Cruz] Yes, it was relayed to us.

[Castro] I know you received it and are working with great enthusiasm. I believe you are making great use of the energy [words indistinct]. I hope you do not lack electricity in order to continue your programs. Please, give my greetings to all the other members of your work team.

[Cruz] I want something. I want, on behalf of the Cuban women who are the rearguard, as you said today, to give you our best wishes and tell you on behalf of all of us in Cuba who love you so much, from our hearts, truly, that we need you very much and we appreciate very much the fact that you are here. We appreciate the example you have set us all these days and all these years. I want to give you a Happy-New-Year kiss on behalf of all those many, many, many people who love you.

[Rodriguez] A hug. I wish you the best.

[Castro] A hug for all the viewers and all the people.

[Rodriguez] Thank you very much, Commander.

[Cruz] Thank you very much, Commander.

Commentary Reviews Relations With Other Nations

PA0501195993 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 0000 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Roberto Morejon commentary]

[Text] Cuba maintains diplomatic or consular relations with over 140 nations of the 178 represented at the United Nations. This demonstrates the failure of U.S. policy to isolate the Caribbean island. The broadening and the consolidation of these ties was the task carried out by Cuban diplomats during the recent years and will continue at the top of the Foreign Ministry's agenda during 1993. The majority of the UN vote on 24 November against the U.S. blockade of Cuba demonstrates the international awareness that Cuba cannot be left out on a limb.

It also highlighted the unfair pressures, recently increased by the unacceptable Torricelli Bill. In addition, in October it was demonstrated that Cuba is not alone when the UN Social and Economic Council accepted Cuba as a member, with the support of over 100 nations. According to Cuban Foreign Relations Ministry officials, Cuba currently maintains its best relations with Latin America, as these relations are more intense, effective, and sincere. Cuba's political disposition contributes to this by giving top priority to its relations with its neighbors, which share traditions, history, and in many cases common aspirations.

During 1992 the increase of expressions of support to the Cuban revolution by unofficial groups and institutions that exist in diverse nations did not go unnoticed. The solidarity toward the Caribbean island and its government registered during this period an unprecedented rise, according to political analysts. Spain, Mexico, Brazil, Nambia, Guadaloupe, Uruguay, France, Martinique, Sweden, and Argentina were the among the nations whose presence has been the most outstanding. Also outstanding was a caravan led by U.S. religious members who traveled through 90 cities in the northern nation to cross the border into Mexico. From there, over 10 tons of supplies and food were shipped to Cuba. The points of disagreement with the United States were heightened even further in 1992. As far as the new Democratic administration is concerned, the Caribbean island hopes the ties between both nations will develop, based on the principles of respect and legality toward the Cuban system and its institutions.

Antigua and Barbuda

CANA Views Highlights of 1992

FL3112195592 Bridgetown CANA in English 1928 GMT 31 Dec 92

[By Colin James]

[Text] St. John's, Antigua, Dec 31, CANA—Charges of corruption against the Vere Bird Sr. administration, the teargassing of opposition demonstrators, a big one-day strike, and a tie for the leadership of the ruling Antigua Labour Party (ALP) were among the highlights here of the year 1992.

Prime Minister Bird, now 83, was repeatedly accused by the weekly opposition newspaper, THE OUTLET, and by opposition politicians of financial wrong-doing. The charge revolved around a government cheque for U.S.25,000 dollars earmarked for a woman seeking medical attention overseas. OUTLET claimed the prime minister had deposited the cheque on his personal bank account. In an interview with a United States television station Bird said he cashed the cheque for the woman as she prepared to leave the country to seek medical attention.

Between January and April, the country's three main opposition parties held a series of pickets and public meetings leading up to a national demonstration and one-day general strike, calling for Bird's resignation over the issue. A peaceful but noisy picket of Parliament ended in police using teargas to disperse about 200 demonstrators campaigning for Bird's removal from office. Some leading opposition spokesmen, including parliamentary opposition leader Baldwin Spencer, were among those teargassed by the police.

The night before Spencer had told a public meeting in St. John's that we would boycott the session of Parliament because the House of Representatives had been adjoured to stop him from moving a motion of no-confidence against the prime minister. Former West Indies cricket captain, Viv Richards, among the spectators affected by the gas, called for a full inquiry into the attack on what he described as an orderly demonstration.

He said: "Everything to me looked pretty peaceful. I could not see in any way what was the cause for some of the events that did take place."

Days after the picket, 32 demonstrators were summoned to appear in a magistrate court to answer charges arising from the incident but the police, on the instructions of the director of public prosecution, dropped the charges.

The campaign to remove Bird Sr. from office climaxed in opposition parties merging to form the United Progressive Party (UPP) under Spencer's leadership. The merger involved Spencer's United National Democratic Party (UNDP), Hector's Antigua-Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM) and Robert Hall's Progressive Labour Movement (PLM), a party which held power between 1971 and 1976.

Addressing supporters when the merger was announced Spencer said: "...The future of this country is dependent on our unity and our coming together."

The campaign against the Bird administration saw more than 5,000 persons taking part in a peaceful rally through the streets of St. John's on April 4 as well as a big motorcade and a national strike April 6. The opposition said the strike to be a success while the government described it as a "dismal failure."

As the protests continued, the prime minister announced that he would be quitting politics at the end of his term of office, in 1994. Bird had been under pressure from several quarters, including a faction in his party led by his son Lester, to step aside because of his age and the perception that corruption has been a major part of Antiguan and Barbudan public life during his stewardship.

The party moved to elect a new leader to replace Bird Sr., but Lester Bird and Information Minister John St. Luce each collected 150 votes. Newly-elected Chairman Adolphous Freeland announced that another convention would be held no later than March next year to choose another ALP leader. There were more problems for the ALP.

In December, a cabinet meeting decided that no government employee should seek to be elected to Parliament or local government bodies. The announcement came five days before a primary was scheduled to take place in the prime minister's St. John's rural north constituency, where some candidates are government employees.

The primary was postponed indefinitely, with a threat from the pro-government Antigua Trades and Labour Union to withdraw its support from the party. The party and its political opponents saw eye to eye on one issue—the fire-bombing of the homes of Parliament Speaker Casford Murray, a former diplomat and the headquarters of the ALP's Women's Action Group (WAG) by unidentified persons. The incident took place over a three day period.

On the economic front, the government announced that its austerity programme, put in place a year ago, would have to continue in light of persisting problems.

The House of Representatives was also a scene of drama in 1992. The opposition leader on one occasion stormed out of the house, protesting the government's withdrawal of two anti-corruption bills passed by the house but rejected by the senate. The bills were the Prevention From Corruption Act and the Integrity in Public Life Act.

Spencer and outspoken government back bencher Hugh Marshall, on separate occasions, were ordered to leave

the house for unruly behaviour. Marshall was suspended for the remainder of the current session.

1992 was also a year that saw concern about the the illegal drugs trade. A Colombian and a Spaniard were each fined EC400,000 dollars (1 East Caribbean dollar = 37 U.S. cents) and given jail sentences of five years by a magistrate after the coast guard intercepted their French-registered vessel with cocaine valued at U.S.21 million dollars.

On the domestic front, employees of the government's Public Works Department, Cable and Wireless, and Barclays Bank took industrial action in an effort to force their employers to accept their pay and other demands.

Haiti

Several Explosions Heard in Port-au-Prince 4 Jan

FL0501163893 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1145 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Strong explosions were heard last night in at least three areas of the metropolitan area, namely Petionville, Bourdon, and Bonne Foi Street, according to residents of those areas. The nature of these explosions is not known. It is also not known whether they caused damage or injuries. A police official, who was contacted this morning, says he does not have precise information on these explosions. Authorities are waiting for the patrols, who were in the streets of Port-au-Prince, to return with detailed information, necessary explanations relating to explosions that were heard last night in the areas of Petionville, Bourdon, and Bonne Foi Street.

Reportage on Ongoing Preparation for Elections

Candidates State Intentions

FL0501163993 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Excerpt] The first point in the news this morning is that the activities for the preparation of the elections continue to progress in the various communes of the country. In the Cap-Haitien commune, 19 Communal Electoral Offices [BEC's] were formed as early as 2 January. The electoral authorities plan to install 100 Voting and Registration Offices [BIV's] in spite of their difficulties in preparing various files. Jocelyn Jean, our correspondent in this department, told us that there are already one senate candidate and two other candidates who have put themselves forward as candidates at the Departmental Electoral Office [BED] of the North.

[Begin Jean recording] It was with the cries: "Up with Pierre Antoine Herve Leveille, senator," that several members and supporters [words indistinct], the Patriotic Action Committee [Comite d'Action Patriotique et de Defense des Citoyens, CAPDC], and several citizens accompanied candidate Herve Leveille to the BED in Cap-Haitien on the morning of 4 January. This was an event for the CAPDC members who had placards in their hands and who were chanting that only crooked dealings and wheelings can prevent Pierre Antoine Herve Leveille from being elected senator for the Department of the North. Herve Leveille is a pharmacist, an independent candidate, and—at the same time—the president of [organization name indistinct] (?which has members) in several communes of the Department of the North.

On 4 January, two candidates for deputies brought their papers to the Cap-Haitien BED. They are Reverend (Diomede D. G. Theodore), candidate for the district of Saint-Raphael and Dondon and Edouard Guillaume Saint-Jean, candidate for the district of Pignon, Ranquitte, and La Victoire. Both of them are members of the Movement for the Establishment of Democracy in Haiti. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Belizaire Launches Campaign

FL0501215393 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1145 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Italicized passages in Creole]

[Text] Dejean Belizaire, president of the National Patriotic Movement of 28 November, MNP-28, intends to participate in the senatorial elections. Senator Dejean Belizaire does not wish to lose a moment in becoming part of the game.

Sen. Belizaire began his electoral campaign on Sunday in Saint- Marc. He took the opportunity to make a completely nationalistic speech. During this meeting, the Senate president [expressed feelings] of being somehow alone in the struggle. He deplored the fact that his political colleagues shunned the 18 January ballot.

Our reporter Edner Jean was in Saint-Marc, attending this meeting held by MNP-28 president, Dejean Belizaire.

[Begin Jean recording] Accompanied by Senators Dupiton, Joseph, and Larosilliere and Planning Minister Jean Andre Victor, Dejean Belizaire made a point of being up-to-date on the Electoral Council timetable, which scheduled the launching of the electoral campaign for January 3. It was before an audience of more than 200 people, essentially composed of MNP-28 sympathizers and the administrative staff of the Movement for the Establishment of Democracy [MIDH], that the president of the National Assembly presented his pitch for the Senate race, during which ten seats need to be filled. Imprinted with nationalism on all its edges, candidate Dejean Belizaire's address was, at times, a strong plea opposing the embargo which has been ordered by 34 countries, OAS members, and which favors national sovereignty. For the first time, Dejean Belizaire stated publicly that all the actions he has taken since the 30 September coup have been aimed at lifting the embargo.

[Begin Belizaire recording] *Our ancestors assumed their identity as Haitians and declared Haiti a free and independent territory. The first of January 1804 was a day that shook the world, and all nations that had planted their flags in the Caribbean, in America and in Africa, felt hurt pride, felt their interests damaged, and swore to destroy those insolent negroes. France therefore ordered an embargo against Haiti, an embargo that lasted more than 30 years. Other countries, on many occasions, attacked Haiti in order to humiliate it.*

In 1915, white Americans landed in the country, while Haitians were dealing with internal problems, searching for good political solutions for the country. After the American soldiers landed in 1915, they realized they had entered a wasp's nest and were forced to stay in the country for 19 years to protect what they wanted to impose on the Haitian people. Our country has now been bent for 15 months under an embargo that 34 countries took pleasure in applying, at the request of the country's own children.[end recording]

[Jean] This electoral speech was an opportunity for Sen. Belizaire to recall his past as an anti-Duvalierist militant while he was still a university student. On behalf of this dear past of a militant student and former member of the National Union of Haitian Students in 1960, Dejean Belizaire sent a vibrant message to the concerned authorities so that they reconsider their decision regarding the students. President of the National Assembly since August 1991, Dejean Belizaire, who is finishing his two-year mandate, is soliciting another six-year term.

The senator, who began his campaign on 3 January, should not have any trouble getting reelected. Facing him is Francois Fouchard (Bergrome), former senator from the January 1988 elections. Two days before the closing of registration, PANPRA [Nationalistic and Progressive Revolutionary Party of Haiti] is still hesitating to register its candidates. Arnold Antonin, the party's second-in-command and possible candidate to the Senate of the Republic for the Department of the West, stated that PANPRA would not participate in the upcoming elections without a guarantee that the electoral body is not at the service of any parties.

[Begin Antonin recording]*We will not go to elections if we cannot verify, if we do not have a guarantee, that the electoral body being set in place is not at the service of any particular person, and that our candidates [words indistinct] because everyone knows that we demand free and well organized elections and [words indistinct] the PANPRA candidates are unbeatable. People will vote in these elections for that. Everyone knows, even those who pretend not to know it, that PANPRA cannot participate in elections that are not honest.*[end recording]

[Jean] It should be noted that PANPRA has always supported the electoral process until the formation of the Electoral Council, arguing that the renewal of the Senate is a necessity. [end recording]

PANPRA Sets Conditions for Participation

FL0501222793 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Arnold Antonin, candidate for the Nationalistic and Progressive Revolutionary Party of Haiti [PANPRA] said the elections are necessary and the people must participate in order for them to be a success. Antonin, who advised that the PANPRA candidates have not yet put themselves forward as candidates, added that the party is waiting for guarantees that the electoral machinery, that is the electoral council, is not biased. Antonin added that PANPRA cannot participate in elections that are not honest.

[Begin Antonin recording] These senatorial elections are a necessity. There must be participation in them; there must be people who run as candidates. But until now, our candidates have not yet run for election because we are making sure we have the guarantee that the electoral machinery which is being set up is not in the service of anybody in particular, that our [potential] candidates can win if they run for election, and that the people will vote because we have candidates who are participating in the elections. Thus, everybody—even those who pretend to be unaware of this—knows that PANPRA cannot participate in elections unless they are honest. We have a number of conditions, and we have a series of things to check before we put ourselves forward as candidates. Obviously, there is not much time. There are only hours left. During these hours, we are doing intense work to make sure that there is that guarantee for all democrats participating in these elections. We explicitly ask that the registration and voting offices, the delegates, the Communal Electoral Offices, and the departmental electoral offices do not belong exclusively to any sector, and that all citizens who meet the requirements to participate can do so. We also ask that representatives of the candidates may observe—in a very serious manner—throughout the operations, especially in the counting of the votes. [end recording]

UPD Announces Non-Participation

FL0501233093 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Another political party, the Union of Patriotic Democrats [UPD], which presents itself as a party that has never participated in mock elections, announces it will not participate in the forthcoming elections. After a look at the situation which Haiti has been experiencing for the past six years, UPD says a responsible sector must come to work to establish a climate of confidence in the country, to put the Constitution in harmony with the country's realities, and to restore constitutional order. This is the only way Haiti can reestablish its prestige and return to the international community so the embargo can be lifted.

The UPD note is signed by Rockfeller Guerre and Dominique Saint-Fleur.

FNCD Delegation Meets With Aristide in Washington

FL0501231293 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1700 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] A delegation of the National Front for Change and Democracy, FNCD, has traveled to Washington. Five FNCD members left Port-au-Prince on 5 January for Washington, the American capital. The objective of this trip is to intensify talks in the camp of the ousted president in order to achieve a negotiating strategy. The FNCD delegation led by Professor Victor Benoit and Senator Turnep Delpe is to meet with ousted President Jean- Bertrand Aristide in the Haitian Embassy in Washington. Let us listen to Evans Paul's explanation:

[Begin Paul recording, in Creole] The first objective is to combine a strategy of negotiation and struggle to reestablish democracy in the country; to organize the return of President Aristide; to normalize living conditions following the 30 September coup. As an ally of President Aristide, who was elected under the FNCD, FNCD remains consistent in supporting the struggle of respect for the people's decision in the 16 December 1990 elections. At this time, when great efforts are being made at the international level to find a solution to the crisis, this meeting will be held between the FNCD and President Aristide so that the FNCD can play its role as it should to intensify the struggle of peaceful policy and negotiations with all other sectors to remove the country from the mess that it has been facing for 15 months. The international community, having political interests in Haiti and elsewhere, and the political men within the community would never capitulate to a small team of people who took the power illegally in Haiti with the people's blood.

There is hope and pressure. Encouragement, because everyone believes that threatening democracy in Haiti is threatening democracy elsewhere. Everyone must understand that. On the other hand, given the complexity of the situation, many people understand that a strategy of negotiation must be established by which the interests of democracy are preserved without destroying anyone. We have always advocated a peaceful solution, a negotiated solution based on respect for the Constitution and respect for the 16 December elections. [end recording]

Dominican Republic

Appointed Officials Sworn In

FL0501180693 Santo Domingo Radio-Television Dominicana Radio Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] President Joaquin Balaguer has sworn in Dr. Jose Leonardo Duran Fajardo as attorney general of the Santo Domingo Appellate Court and Engineer Caonabo Javier Castillo as secretary of state without portfolio. Also sworn in were (Miguel Samben) as technical secretary of the presidency, Hector Valdez Alvizu as administrator of the Reserve Bank, Hector Vidorio Caminero as immigration director, and Eduardo Antun Valle as the director of Dominican Corporation of State Enterprises, Corde. The officials appointed by presidential decree were sworn in by Secretary of State of the Presidency Enrique Perez y Perez, retired major general.

Balaguer Orders PRSC 'Complete Reorganization'

FL0401171493 Santo Domingo Radio-Television Dominicana Radio Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 4 Jan 93

[Text] President Joaquin Balaguer has ordered the start of an extensive process throughout the country of internal reorganization of the Social Christian Reformist Party [PRSC]. This was announced in Barahona Province by PRSC Organization Secretary Luis Toral. According to Toral, President Balaguer has ordered a complete reorganization from top to bottom. Toral made this announcement while making the main speech at a regional meeting of PRSC officials held at the Barahona provincial administration officies. The PRSC presidents, secretaries general, and secretaries of electoral affairs from Pedernales, Baoruco, Independencia, and Barahona Provinces were present at the event.

Trinidad and Tobago

Manning Announces 'Minor Reshuffle'

FL0501185593 Bridgetown CANA in English 1818 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, Jan 5, CANA—Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister Patrick Manning on Tuesday announced a minor reshuffle and changes in government structure with a view to "achieving greater governmental efficiency." One area which was adjusted was the information division, which Manning said would now become a "consulting firm" to the government.

"Ministers are free to utilise the services of the information division or to solicit such services from the private sector if those services are not available in the public sector," he said. Manning said Gordon Draper, the minister in the office of the prime minister with responsibilities for public administration, was now in charge of public information.

Camille Regis-Robinson, who held responsibilities for information, was shifted to assist Planning and Development Minister Lenny Saith, who was given additional responsibilities for library services.

Youth training programmes were removed from the Ministry of Sport, Culture, Youth Affairs to the Ministry of Education. Agriculture Parliamentary Secretary Andrew Cassimire was transferred to the Ministry of Legal Affairs. He will be replaced by Senator Stanford Callender who was removed from the permanent secretary job at the Ministry of Labour. No replacement was named.

Manning also formally designated Foreign Affairs Minister Ralph Maraj as minister for Caricom [Caribbean Community] Affairs. "What this does, is to create a focal point in government for Caricom matters," said Manning.

He also said the changes allow government to be in a better position to properly discharge its functions. "There we have it.... optimism in 1993," the prime minister remarked.

El Salvador

Government Issues Communique on Army Purges

PA0601004293 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSU in Spanish 0130 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Once the Armed Forces general order was revealed, the United Nations issued a declaration, stating that up to 2 January, President Cristiani had not complied with the [Armed Forces purge] commitments established in the peace agreements.

On 3 January, the first reactions were heard in the country. Catholic Archbishop [name indistinct] said there should be no dabbling with the peace agreements. The opposition also expressed its discontent because the Ad Hoc Commission recommendations have not been implemented.

On 4 January, the government issued the following communique:

In reference to information reported by international cables and published in national and foreign media regarding the Armed Forces general order of 31 December 1992, which refers to the compliance of the peace agreements, specifically with respect to the Ad Hoc Commission recommendations, the Government of El Salvador informs its citizens:

1. There is an addition to the aforementioned order which, due to its confidential nature, is not public knowledge.

[Begin announcer comment] This means that there is a secret order that President Cristiani will reveal only to the UN General Assembly secretary general. He will send two envoys to inform Mr. Butrus Butrus-Ghali of the second order, which contains the names of all the persons that are to be retired, discharged, or transferred to the foreign service. [end comment]

2. Consistent to the agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the UN secretary general, the handling of all the information related to this matter has been and will continue to be confidential.

Therefore, the Government of El Salvador urges the Salvadorans to maintain a calm attitude as it is required for the country's political stability and the consolidation of peace longed by all.

We also request foreign and national media to abstain from reporting speculative information, which does not reflect our current reality or the Salvadoran Government's actions.

[Issued] El Salvador, 4 January 1993

President Requests Extension for Purge

PA0501214793 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 2035 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Report by Ricardo Alday]

[Text] New York, 5 Jan (NOTIMEX)—Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani asked the United Nations on 5 January to allow him to carry out the Army purge in a progressive manner that would presumably end in May 1994, it was reported by diplomatic sources.

The sources told NOTIMEX the proposal was presented here to UN officials by Salvadoran Presidency Minister Oscar Santamaria and General Mauricio Vargas, the deputy chief of staff.

Cristiani's presidential term is scheduled to end in May 1994 and, according to the initiative submitted to the United Nations, the highest ranking Army officers who must be purged would leave with him, it was indicated.

The procedure includes disciplinary dismissals, retirements requested by the affected officers, and appointments in the foreign service, among other measures.

The Army purge should have concluded on 31 December according to the 1992 peace accords and in compliance with the recommendations issued by a civilian commission, which decided the responsibility of military officers involved in human rights violations during 12 years of civil war.

The recommendations for the dismissal or removal of military officers have been kept confidential but diplomatic sources indicate it includes 116 Army members of different ranks, led by Defense Minister Rene Emilio Ponce and Deputy Minister Orlando Cepeda.

Neither Santamaria or Vargas mentioned the details of the document delivered to the United Nations, saying it was due to "the confidential nature of the process;" adding they will remain in New York until Thursday, 7 January.

"We will wait for the UN secretary general's evaluation of the document and his reply," Santamaria told the media following a meeting with Alvaro de Soto, political adviser to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, and Marrack Goulding, UN under secretary general.

Reports datelined in San Salvador indicate the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] reported the purging process "is not being effectively carried out."

Facundo Guardado, member of the FMLN political commission, said on 5 January in San Salvador a partial implementation of the pledge causes a "destabilization" in the peace process and casts doubts on the effectiveness of Cristiani's role as chief of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

The United Nations must reach a decision on the government's proposal in a few days.

FMLN Issues Communique on Army Purge

PA0601153293 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSU in Spanish 0130 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Communique issued by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN, Political Commission in San Salvador on 4 January]

[Text] The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN, Political Commission,

Whereas,

The peace agreements are a victory of the Salvadoran people and the FMLN has committed all its efforts to the attainment and compliance of said agreements;

The agreement on the Armed Forces purge is a just and necessary claim of the victims who suffered from the military institutions' repression against the people and is indispensable to attain national reconciliation and the subordination of the military to the government and civilian society, which is a basic and decisive step to further the existence of democracy in the country.

The Government of El Salvador is obliged to implement the Ad Hoc Commission's decisions.

The FMLN, therefore, resolves:

1. To urge the Government of El Salvador to implement immediately the Ad Hoc Commission's decisions in its 23 September 1992 report.

2. To mark that, according to the agreement, it is the UN secretary general's responsibility to determine if the government has honestly complied with the commitment of implementing the Ad Hoc Commission's conclusions.

3. To highlight the UN statement that if the Salvadoran Defense Ministry news bulletin is confirmed and the personnel changes ordered on 31 December are the only changes to be made, the UN secretary general will have to conclude the government has not kept its commitment.

4. To reaffirm the purge of the Armed Forces is indispensable for stability and peace in the country.

5. To ask the Salvadoran people and the international community to urge the Salvadoran Government to implement the Ad Hoc Commission's decisions and to continue to be vigilant until the decisions are totally implemented.

6. To manifest to the Armed Forces that its 31 December news bulletin is an offense to the people and to the peace agreements. The bulletin again proves there are sectors in the armed institution who are reluctant to comply with the agreements. It does not benefit the Armed Forces in any way to resist the irreversible ongoing process of democratic changes in the country.

7. To make the Armed Forces comprehend the purge will benefit the Salvadoran people and the military institution, as it will allow the Armed Forces to win the people's respect. In addition, the people will have an honorable institution at its service that defends our sovereignty and national territory with dignity.

FMLN's Shafik Handal on Army Purge

PA0601044793 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSKL in Spanish 0320 GMT 6 Jan 93

[News conference by Shafik Handal, leader of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN, with unidentified reporters at the FMLN headquarters in San Salvador—live]

[Text] [Shafik Handal] We thank everyone for attending this news conference. The country currently is facing a very important situation. We have met to establish our position concerning the Armed Forces purge and the decisions adopted by the government in this regard. We also want to state that we will exclusively refer to this topic on this occasion and we will state our views. We have done it in writing and we will distribute copies of the declaration I will now read.

The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN, states the following to the national and international public:

The Armed Forces purge is an important achievement of the Salvadoran people for the true achievement of democracy and peace. The FMLN believes the first important step has been taken in the correct direction, to comply with the decisions adopted by the Ad Hoc Commission. However, the step is still insufficient because it does not fully implement the decisions.

We urge the UN secretary general to continue verifying and supervising compliance with this agreement on the purge, so it may conclude as soon as possible. We cannot let reactionary groups that oppose the process of changes within the Armed Forces continue to obstruct the purge and the establishment of democratic guidelines for the corps, according to the peace accords and the Salvadoran people's wishes.

The FMLN believes the purge process is under way and it will successfully conclude with the efforts and support of the whole nation, turning the Armed Forces into an institution that is accredited to civilian society, professional, obedient to the democratically elected government, and dedicated to fulfilling its constitutional duties.
[Signed] FMLN Political Commission, El Salvador, 5 January 1993.

This is our declaration.

[Reporter] And now the FMLN leaders will answer some questions from reporters, although it seems they are not ready to answer questions. [Question indistinct]

[Shafik Handal] No, there were no agreements with the government. There were talks that did not end with any agreements.

[Reporter] However, Presidency Minister Oscar Santamaria, told the United Nations that you were in good disposition toward the Armed Forces purging process stretching into 1994. How do you interpret that?

[Shafik Handal] Well, I think you should ask Santamaria from where he got such an idea. We are in favor of the institution being purged, but we never spoke to him about it.

[Reporter] [Question indistinct]

[Shafik Handal] That issue is being handled exclusively by the United Nations and there have been no problems arising at the United Nations regarding it.

[Reporter] But you recently said there were problems and that there was someone trying to create a crisis. Is that no longer true?

[Shafik Handal] You should not let yourself be caught by gossip, you know. [laughter]

[Reporter] It is said you have been meeting with the government.

[Shafik Handal] Yes, we have met several times, because there were several issues regarding the peace agreements pending. The peace agreement implementation process was not totally completed on 15 December, as established by the latest rescheduling process. There are still several points which need to be completed. We have reached partial agreements on the Armed Forces, the National Civilian Police, land, and other issues regarding the media and the FMLN, security, and there are several more pending. We decided to go ahead with the activities on 15 December to end the cease-fire, or better still the armed peace, for all the reasons we listed during the events. However, we also got the government's commitment that the pending agreements would be completed. We held several meetings to set the terms ruling those pending issues. From there we established a sort of extraordinary complementary timetable. The United Nations accepted the agreement and they are verifying its implementation.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] Does this mean that what was supposed to happen by 31 [word indistinct], will now happen in the coming days?

[Shafik Handal] We have put this down in writing, so that you can examine it in detail.

[Reporter] [Question indistinct]

[Shafik Handal] We have said a step has been taken in the right direction, but not everything has been completed. We are encouraging the UN secretary general to fulfill his mission as he has been doing up to now, and help to complete this process as soon as possible.

[Reporter] [Question indistinct]?

[Shafik Handal] The FMLN is here saying itself what it has to say instead of having spokesmen in the diplomatic corps.

[Reporter] [Question indistinct]?

[Shafik Handal] No, we are saying there must be full compliance with as soon as possible....

[Reporter, interrupting] What do you mean by as soon as possible?

[Shafik Handal] The meaning our language has for it. I do not think we can talk about as soon as possible when [words indistinct].

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] warning President Cristiani about the failure to comply with the agreements [words indistinct]?

[Shafik Handal] We know nothing about the statements of the secretary general besides a bulletin issued by the secretary general's spokesman of which everyone knows. We are actually waiting for his new statements.

FMLN's Guardado on Army Purge, Negotiations

PA0601033893 San Salvador Radio Venceremos Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Facundo Guardado, member of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN], held a news conference on 5 January and referred to the main point which concerns civilian society, meaning the Armed Forces purge. According to national and international news reports, this issue has been negotiated between the FMLN and the government. The news conference mainly served to clarify this point and discuss others, including the crisis that has reportedly arisen between the People's Liberation Forces [FPL] and the People's Revolutionary Army [ERP]—which was not denied or confirmed. Other issues were also reviewed, including the case of El Espino, which has recently been very much in the news because Navarro [not further identified] accused former Commander Joaquin Villalobos of holding negotiations with the Pomas family. We were told this was something personal and the FMLN's position endorsed the protection of our country's ecological patrimony.

[Begin Guardado recording] According to resolutions from the Ad Hoc Commission which evaluated the Army, President Cristiani had to dismiss 66 military commanders by 1 January; and he had to adopt administrative measures for the removal of 27 more. Based on the information we have so far on these additional measures, he has only dismissed 23 officers, aside from the orders given on 31 December. This represents 30 percent of the 66 military commanders who had to be dismissed.

We believe—and this belief is shared by a majority of the Salvadoran society, which endorses changes in the country—the purge is not being carried out according to the Ad Hoc Commission's resolution and the peace accords. This is a measure which provokes instability. The achievement of democracy in the country is at stake and we will see if the Army will truly submit to civilian power. We still have serious doubts about this because we believe the Army... [pauses] the Army group which must be purged will tell President Cristiani what to do.

The FMLN has held no negotiations with the government concerning the list issued by the Ad Hoc Commission for the Army purge. The FMLN has participated in talks with

the government to review the time on active duty of a very small group of officers—less than 10 percent of the whole list—considering that this might be necessary for a transition and for the country's stability. This has not been accepted by the government so we do not accept the conditions the Army wants to impose on this issue. [end recording]

When we interviewed Facundo Guardado we asked him about the Radio Venceremos report that former Commander Leonel Gonzalez had started negotiations with the government concerning the Armed Forces. This was his answer:

[Begin recording] [Guardado] No, Leonel has not held talks. Leonel has participated in talks held between the FMLN command and the government.

[Unidentified reporter] [Question indistinct]

[Guardado] Some people like to spread this kind of rumor. We have a position which, we believe, interprets the will of a majority in Salvadoran society. [end recording]

Deputy Criticizes Lack of Army Changes

PA0501134093 San Salvador Radio Farabundo Marti Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 4 Jan 93

[Report by Dagoberto Correa]

[Text] On 4 January, Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Perez, a Nationalist Republican Alliance deputy, stated it is inconceivable that the required changes in the Army—especially at the command staff level—have still not been made. [words indistinct]

According to Ochoa Perez, a defense minister should be an individual with a great amount of prestige. He said the defense minister did not necessarily have to be a military officer and could be a civilian.

Ochoa Perez stated the lack of changes in the Army structures had prompted the UN secretary general's apprehension. He added the required military changes might appear in the 6 January order.

[Begin Ochoa recording] The truth is that the president is not a expert in military matters basically because he is a civilian. In this sense, [words indistinct] who are the officers on the list. I have always stated that nobody can be condemned without being heard [words indistinct.] Many officers—particularly, a few of my friends—have told me they were simply told they were discharged and were to go to Cuba. [sentence as heard] [end recording]

Ochoa Perez believes the war was handled at the command staff level and not from the middle military echelons. He, thus, believes the reduction and purge of the military structure has to start at the command level.

[Begin Ochoa recording] [words indistinct] I do not believe [words indistinct] several people and blaming people who are not able to defend themselves. As a soldier, I personally believe [words indistinct] many officers who are on that list who will simply be discharged but others, who should be discharged, are left at their posts. [words indistinct] those who have starched shirts and no mud on their boots are at ease [words indistinct]. I do not agree. The officer, who was the one who had to fight, is being abandoned. I do not find this to be just. [end recording]

In conclusion, Ochoa Perez said the Armed Forces are to blame for not purging itself previously and now they are obliged to do so. He added the purge is neither truthful nor just.

Commentary Says Cristiani Not Honoring Agreements

PA0501171893 San Salvador Radio Farabundo Marti Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 4 Jan 93

[Station commentary]

[Text] The fact the purge of the Armed Forces, recommended by the Ad Hoc Commission, has not been implemented is a clear and definite sign of the political defeat of militarism that enthroned itself even stronger than the ruling Nationalist Republican Alliance [Arena] party. [sentence as heard] In the following days, however, the whole country will understand El Salvador has to be governed based on a unity of interests, including the interests of the opposition and the entire nation. Not to initiate a true purge in the Armed Forces is one of Cristiani's biggest mistakes after the war ended in the country. The government has not kept its commitments. This new behavior will have serious political costs at the national level, as well as internationally, and even at the United Nations.

The government, Arena, and the current military command staff have acted in bad faith, believing they can continue to impose their interests on civilian society with their economic and military force. Such an appraisal is totally erroneous and is not based on our current reality.

At any rate, what does it mean that President Cristiani is not honoring his commitments? It means the military officers involved in large scale crimes such as El Mozote or Sumpul continue to stick their military boots inside the Presidential Palace. It also means these military officers, who are a genuine cancer, have not been uprooted from the state structure, even though the war has ended.

Now, the only thing left to do is wonder if society is willing to let this happen. Are the young military officers willing to allow this situation to continue? Will the United States, the EC, the Salvadoran and foreign unions continue to tolerate this?

At a time such as now, when there is talk of reconciliation, President Alfredo Cristiani has taken a step that can be interpreted as resolute and pure confrontation. The military has brought about an attack against the international aid our country desperately needs. The military have brought about the first conditions of tension following the war. It will be the task and duty of all sectors to force the government and the Armed Forces to honor their peace

commitments signed by President Cristiani himself in Chapultepec in February 1992. [date as heard]

Nicaragua

Minister Leal on UN 'Exceptional Case' Status

PA0501213493 Managua Sistema Nacional de Television Network in Spanish 0230 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Passages within quotations are recorded]

[Text] Nicaragua enters 1993 consolidated with regard to a successful diplomatic offensive, Foreign Minister Ernesto Leal has said. Leal commented on the historical UN resolution on Nicaraguan status as an exceptional case in the international community. The draft bill labeled: International Assistance for Nicaraguan Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in the Aftermaths of War and Natural Disasters, was sponsored by 47 nations. Here is what Foreign Minister Leal said:

[Leal] "The exceptional process that Nicaragua is experiencing was presented at the 45th UN General Assembly held in 1990, when President Violeta Chamorro gave her first speech to that international organization. "

The positive UN reply to the request indicates its concern for all the efforts that Nicaragua has undertaken in light of the difficulties it has experienced due to the effects of war and natural disasters.

[Leal] "That resolution's most important factor is that the UN General Assembly requests the secretary general to undertake all his efforts before international financial institutions and before other nations, so that, upon the request of the Nicaraguan Government, they lend their assistance for the consolidation of peace. This assistance could include the relocation of displaced persons, war refugees, property issues, land tenure, and any other aspect that may be necessary to foster the consolidation of peace. In this way, the democratic process and consolidation of peace in Nicaragua will be irreversible."

Leal said this means UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali will also have Nicaragua on his agenda. This fact was demonstrated by his recent visit to Nicaragua.

[Leal] "The effects of this resolution is that the group of nations that are UN members will always be aware that Nicaragua is a special country. Nicaragua is a nation that not only experienced a war but also was submitted to a destroyed economy. The initiation of its economic development to be self-sufficient in the future, therefore, is very important. Above all, this places an emphasis on the need for all the nations' cooperation."

Nicaragua's image before the world has been consolidated for 1993.

[Leal] "Nicaragua initiates the year by consolidating an aggressive foreign policy, consolidating a foreign policy that it has been emphasizing in all international forums and where Nicaragua's spokesmen and their positions have been heard and supported by other nations. For example, last week, at the request of Nicaragua, a UN resolution was approved that for the first time changes the issue of the Central American agenda. This is a resolution based on Central America. Previously there was talk about the [word indistinct] of a firm and lasting peace and now there is talk about the establishment of a firm and lasting peace and the progress made in the organization of a region with peace, democracy, and development."

Another Nicaraguan achievement is that it will host the OAS General Assembly in Managua during the first week of June 1993.

National Assembly President News Conference

PA0601041593 Managua Radio Corporacion in Spanish 1530 GMT 5 Jan 93

[News conference by National Assembly President Alfredo Cesar with unidentified reporters at the headquarters of the National Opposition Union, UNO, in Managua—live]

[Text] [Cesar] The National Assembly general statutes provide that the board of directors must convoke plenary sessions with at least 72 hours notice. In other words, any summons is legal if it is made 72 or more hours before the time at which the plenary session is held. Moreover, the old statute provides that, when there is enough advance notice, the two oldest and two youngest deputies will be selected to notify me that they will be in charge of the election and vote count for people elected on 9 January. The last 72 hours before the 9 January session will begin tomorrow, and the deadline to notify the two oldest and the two youngest deputies was Saturday, 2 January. The coup was staged on Tuesday, 29 December. Thus, it was staged four days before the board of directors could proceed with our plans to utilize all the mechanisms to legally issue a convocation to the 9 January session.

[Reporter] Engineer, I have learned that the government is going to emphatically deny that you were not allowed to enter the National Assembly. That was one thing. Additionally, can you tell us what authority the government minister has to summon and swear in the oldest and youngest representatives of the National Assembly? Please explain this.

[Cesar] First of all, I would not be surprised if the government continues to lie to the Nicaraguan people and the international community. There are many witnesses to the fact that I arrived and attempted to enter the National Assembly and was prevented from doing so. In fact, the troops were urged to consult their superiors to avoid making a mistake. A military officer with two bars—I do not know what rank that is—came out of the Presidential House, crossed the street, and confirmed the orders not to allow entry. Therefore, the government can say whatever it wishes, but the fact is that under military orders, rather than by the decision of a civilian authority, entry to the installations of the National Assembly was barred to the

person who continues to be the Assembly's legal president until 9 January, as well as to the other members of the board of directors.

As for what the government minister has done, well, the first illegal act was committed by President Chamorro. Obviously, the government minister and any other minister are her subordinates. The illegal act was committed by the president of the republic who, without any constitutional authority or legal faculty, is responsible for, first, the military occupation of the National Assembly in violation of the sovereignty of the Nicaraguan parliament; second, for the convocation to a plenary session—imagine a chief of state, a chief executive calling a plenary session of a parliament in a democratic country; and third, in addition to the foregoing, for removing by military force the only legally instituted board of directors and hand picking four representatives, who have no mandate of any kind, to exercise more authority than the board of directors itself, which should have been the one to convoke the 9 January session.

Therefore, in view of those illegal acts committed by the president of the republic, it does not surprise me that [Acting Government Minister] Mendieta or any of her other subordinates should continue to commit such acts.

[Reporter] Eng. Alfredo Cesar, in summary, how will the summons for the election of the new board of directors on 9 January be carried out? Will UNO deputies heed that summons?

[Cesar] You will have to ask the deputies directly. The UNO faction already issued a statement some days ago. We are the institutional leaders of the parliament, so I am going to answer only the first part of your question. The board of directors has been summoned for today, 5 January, for the purpose of preparing a legal summons for 9 January. I was prevented by the military forces from holding that meeting and even from entering the National Assembly installations to carry out the meeting of the board of directors for that purpose. As long as there continues to be a military occupation of the National Assembly, the board of directors will not be able to convoke the 9 January sessions. As long as the military occupation of the Assembly continues, there is no possibility of a legal convocation for the 9 January session.

We are still in time to do that which is necessary to resolve the country's situation, and all it will take is a little common sense on the part of those governing this country and a little sensibility from the people. [90 second break in reception] The situation became illegitimate when the president decided to govern alongside those who officially lost the elections, thus legalizing what has, in fact, been going on for about one or one and a half years. Besides the illegitimacy of this, we now have a problem of illegality. This in itself is more serious than illegitimacy.

This illegality is summarized by the things I have just pointed out: the military occupation of the congress, which breached the body's independence and sovereignty; the removal of the legal board of directors by military force; and the convocation of a 9 January session made by the president herself. These three things are flagrantly unconstitutional and illegal.

What, then, does this all mean? If the situation continues until 9 January; if this directorate—the only body legally authorized to convoke a meeting for 9 January—does not convoke such a session on 9 January, as established by the by-laws and the Constitution, the session will be totally void and illegal. Those who are elected at that time will have no legal credentials or authority. This would mean President Chamorro would not only be officially governing with the losers of the election, which is illegal according to the people's mandate, but she would also be doing so illegally through a board of directors with no legal mandate, as they will have been elected during a meeting that did not meet the proper requirements for convocation. So, they have added insult to injury. They have added illegality to illegitimacy. Illegitimacy was established even before the coup and is what brought about the (Monte Dimar) statement and the political expression of the UNO bench warning of this situation in the first place. Now we have, on top of all this, the flagrant illegality of the coup perpetrated against the National Assembly.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] I would like to know what happened at the meeting this morning between Humberto Guzman [president of the Popular Social Christian Party], Sergio Ramirez [head of the Sandinist faction in the National Assembly], and Gustavo Tablada [secretary general of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party]. Was the meeting handled by the opposition? What type of discussions were held?

[Cesar] All that pertaining to the political negotiations between the various factions has nothing to do with the directorate, as you well know. We have maintained total separation between the directorate and its institutional obligations at the National Assembly and the political negotiations among factions, which are conducted, directed, and carried out by their own representatives. Therefore, you would have to address that question to the negotiation commissions assigned by the UNO faction leaders.

[Reporter] Do you know what came of the meetings?

[Cesar] No, I do not know and have no reason to know, because I am not a member of any of the negotiating teams. My duty is to head this board of directors and, along with my colleagues, direct the institution in a legal fashion, up until 9 January and the legal election and the swearing in of the new board of directors of the National Assembly, which is when we will transfer the leadership of the congress. That is our duty and we are concentrating on that. However....

[Reporter, interrupting] [Question indistinct]

[Cesar] After we finish this news conference, I am sure the other faction leaders will be available to comment on that issue. We do not wish to confuse the institutional problem, which is the most serious problem the country faces, with the political proposals the UNO has repeatedly made and

maintained its willingness to carry them out, and which we hope will result in the solution of the problem.

[Reporter] It has been said that if the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front] should control the National Assembly directorate, UNO deputies would then become the opposition faction. What meaning does being the opposition faction have with regard to the country's development?

[Cesar] If that situation were to hold true, that is, the illegitimacy issue, I would insist we are dealing with two separate topics. If a directorate were to be elected legally on 9 January—and this would be out of the control of a UNO majority—UNO would, as it has already said in a public communique, would move to the opposition.

This would confirm the Executive Branch's decision to govern with the Sandinist minority that lost the elections. This would constitute a distortion and betrayal of the mandate given by the people in February 1990 on the part of the authorities of the Executive Branch for deciding to make official its co-government with the Sandinist minority.

Moreover, the democratic institutional order has been broken in Nicaragua and a coup d'etat has been dealt on the Legislative Branch. The National Assembly has been occupied militarily. Thus, they would be electing a new directorate on 9 January under totally illegal conditions.

The government of the republic, I think, would be unveiling a new dictatorship in Nicaragua with absolute openness. It would be challenging the Legislative Branch, the country's parliament, which was directly elected by the people, through military means. The parliament was the last obstacle on the way of the consolidation of the Executive Branch-Sandinist co-government. We would be clearly at the door of a new dictatorship in Nicaragua. It would be very similar to Fujimori's dictatorship in Peru.

We must be clear about something: The only different between what Fujimori did in Peru and what Violeta Chamorro is now doing in Nicaragua is that Fujimori used the guards to dissolve the parliament and Violeta Chamorro is using the guards to impose a new directorate in the parliament illegally.

[Reporter] [Question indistinct]?

[Cesar] That is very simple; in civilized countries, when there are constitutional conflicts, the branches of state involved meet to settle them. We just saw in Russia, less than one month ago, that a very serious conflict—similar to the current one between the Executive and Legislative Branches in Nicaragua—was settled when two branches of state met to solve it.

That is what happens in civilized countries seeking to consolidate their democracies. Those that are not seeking to consolidate democracy do what Nicaragua is doing. They use brute force, military force to settle conflicts. We have been completely willing to make efforts to settle the conflict between the branches of state as the Constitution mandates: through harmonious coordination between them.

In my most recent news conference in December, I confirmed we are completely willing to hold talks with the chief executive. We were never called or invited to a meeting. Military force was sent directly to settle the conflict. Violeta Chamorro will be held accountable for this by history.

I must say the following: The accounts of the National Assembly are up to date as of 31 December, because we closed the legislature on 15 December and closed the Assembly building on 21 or 22 December. We were inactive after that date. The audit, which was requested from the Comptroller General's Office by the directorate and its president, started two months ago and will soon be concluded in January. This process has not been interrupted.

I wish, however, to add the following: I have not been allowed to enter my office or review my files. I want to ask the vice president and secretary whether they have been able to review the files in their respective offices to [words indistinct]. A declaration issued by the UNO bloc warns the following in a paragraph that I will read textually.

This statement was made on 30 December, the day after the military coup was carried out. The statement reads as follows: No. 6. The intervention of the government ministry in the National Assembly, at the request of persons who do not make up the legally constituted board of directors, is illegal and constitutes a violation of the parliamentary precinct. In the same manner, the seizure of National Assembly documents lends itself to conducting inappropriate or secret operations and introducing false documents with the purpose of politically discrediting persons.

The UNO faction clearly warns that the military occupation can also lend itself to falsifying, removing, and introducing parliamentary documents over a given period of time—from the afternoon of the 29th, when the military forces entered, to the night of 3 January, before the personnel entered on duty on Monday morning. This was ample time in which the military forces had total control of the National Assembly documents, installations, and everything that is there. We trust, therefore, that common sense will not allow the National Assembly documents to be violated with the objectives you have already anticipated, of making false accusations against the president of the assembly or against any of the officials who have been working in the National Assembly. We will not know about this until we can confirm the status of the National Assembly archives. I want to ask the vice president if he has been able to confirm the status of the documents?

[(?Luis Domingo Sanchez Sancho)] No, I haven't.

[Cesar] You haven't been able to. What about the secretary?

[(?Nicolas Bolanos)] I just arrived for a moment. I know that Ray Hooker was in my office yesterday afternoon and met with two assembly secretaries. This was confirmed by my private secretary, who was outside. I understand that there have not been any documents removed. I cannot confirm this, however. I was at the National Assembly for a short time and went to my office. Then I learned that Alfredo Cesar was not allowed to enter. I announced that the meeting that could not be held in the National Assembly would be held here in the UNO office. I went immediately to the UNO office. I, therefore, have not had occasion to confirm anything. I was able to enter my office in the secretariat for a few minutes only.

[Unidentified speaker] I want to say something important. On 31 December, I sent a verbal message to Domingo Sanchez Salgado, advising him of the possibility that false documents might be introduced to attack the dignity, honesty, and integrity of assembly officials. I reminded Domingo that he knew perfectly well that was possible. When the Sandinist National Liberation Front took power in 1979 it introduced into the archives false records indicating that he, Domingo Sanchez Salgado, Gustavo Tablada, and Luis Sanchez had served the Somozist cause. Tomas Borge later referred to this in a speech, leveling accusations against Domingo Sanchez, Chaguitillo. Thanks to the intervention of Eli Altamirano, who was a member of the MPU [expansion unknown] at that time, he convinced the Sandinist authorities of the monstrosity that they were committing on trying to send us to prison for 30 years. I asked him to please be very careful. He answered me on 1 January, through another person, saying he would be careful so that nothing would happen. I, however, am still concerned. Regardless of his goodwill, honesty, and experience, he is not in a position to control the manipulation that could have occurred in the assembly documents.

[Reporter] [question indistinct]

[Cesar] We will have to wait for the 9th to see what happens before we can determine what legal measures can be taken.

[Reporter] Regarding the military occupation or military coup, what amparo would be filed?

[Cesar] The amparo would have to be contemplated, depending on what happens on the 9th, considering the legality or illegality of what occurs there.

[Reporter] What legal proceedings would be used?

[Cesar] No legal proceedings are contemplated on what is to be done when [word indistinct] is occupied militarily. The assembly regulations do not contemplate what is to be done if there is a military coup against it. What we have, therefore, is the legal board of directors paralyzed, because of the military occupation of the National Assembly. If the military occupation of the assembly ceases, the board of directors can then function and do whatever is necessary to convoke the meeting on the 9th. As long as the National Assembly is occupied and the military coup against the parliament exists, there is no procedure contemplated in any constitution or in any general statute for such cases.

[Reporter] Could you not convoke the assembly somewhere else?

[Cesar] We cannot operate as a board of directors without at least having access to the board's files in order to do things legally, as we are supposed to. We can only carry out our sessions where they are supposed to be carried out.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] I would like your opinion on a poll taken at the end of 1992 that said you were the most unpopular government figure and that Arnoldo Aleman, the mayor of Managua, was the most popular figure. Also, do you believe that your work at the assembly is to blame for the current confrontation with the military?

[Cesar] I am glad Arnoldo was voted the most popular, not as in previous polls that have shown other figures we all know to be highly unpopular heading the lists. These polls depend a lot on who you ask and I, frankly, have never tried to run the congress as if it were a beauty pageant to see who likes me and who does not. Instead, I have run it based on my ethical, moral, and political duty to direct the congress in strict accordance with the Constitution and the law.

Regarding the possibility of the UNO Political Council issuing a document, I would prefer you ask Wilfredo Navarro, the coordinator of the Political Council. I repeat that we have given this news conference as the board of directors of the National Assembly, and we do not wish to mix this with the strictly political issues the UNO faction, or their leaders in the Political Council, will be addressing, even though we are also members thereof. Thank you ladies and gentlemen for your presence here this morning.

[Reporter] Ladies and gentlemen, Radio Corporacion is bringing you live coverage from the UNO offices of the news conference by Alfredo Cesar, the president of the Eighth National Assembly, which concludes on 9 January.

We would like to take advantage to ask Alfredo Cesar one last question. Mr. Cesar there is a question that the Nicaraguan people, by way of Radio Corporacion, would like to ask you. The people would like to know what will happen, in your opinion as the president of the Eighth National Assembly, if the government does not change its stance? Also, as a leader of the UNO, what do you believe will happen if these things do not turn out as they should?

[Cesar] Nicaragua must realize what really happened as of 29 December. As the public sector was on holiday, it was not until 4 and 5 January that the president of the assembly was prevented from entering the assembly building by military force. We must realize that there has been a military coup d'etat against the National Assembly. I mean, I cannot go into the halls of the assembly or into my office at the assembly building, because armed men are preventing me from doing so. Nicaragua must realize that this is happening right now. Those of us who are peaceful citizens have no resources to face brute force, military force. If this situation should continue through 9 January,

it will mark the end of the blooming democratic process in Nicaragua. The people's expectations, as expressed in February 1990, will die. That responsibility will fall upon the shoulders of President Chamorro and her government, as she ordered the military coup against the National Assembly.

Today is Tuesday, 5 January. If the president reconsiders her decision and removes the military forces from the National Assembly, she would allow the congress to recover and legally convoke the assembly session and hold legal elections on 9 January. This is the tragedy we are experiencing now. This is why I said that our blooming democracy is fatally wounded. It has not died yet. It will die on 9 January if the current situation prevails.

[Reporter] It has also been said that UNO has summoned the Nicaraguan people, all the country's living forces, into the streets for a national march.

[Cesar] No, not for a national march. We have called a meeting first, on 6 January at 1000 [1500 GMT], with the country's civil forces to make the decisions that need to be made to face this situation.

[Reporter] Could we call this the countdown?

[Cesar) That is correct. Precisely, as of 6 January. The specific action UNO and the democratic civil forces will take later will be decided at that meeting.

[Reporter] Thank you Mr. Alfredo Cesar.

FSLN New Year Message to People

PA0501221593 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 2 Jan 93 pp 1, 10

["Text" of New Year's message issued by the Sandinist National Liberation Front, FSLN, to the Nicaraguan people in Managua on 31 December 1992]

[Text] Fellow Nicaraguans:

As the year 1992 ends with a great deal of suffering and frustration for most Nicaraguans, we should join our best efforts and transform them into actions to make the year 1993 one of hope.

Frustration resulting from the lack of jobs, medical care, and food made 1992 one of the saddest years in our history.

The frustration and insecurity over land ownership by the peasants, the retired members of the Army and the Government Ministry, the workers of state enterprises, and the demobilized peasants of the resistance have been destabilizing elements with negative consequences for the national economy.

More than 150,000 families that have been awarded lots and houses in neighborhoods and settlements feel insecure and frustrated. Since their right to be considered as the legitimate owners of their enterprises is not being acknowledged, the employees of industries, businesses, and service and transportation enterprises feel insecure and frustrated and this has been a destabilizing element that has affected society as a whole.

The year 1992 has been one of frustration and insecurity for the peasants because they continue to die as those who have everything, and who like to wail whenever blood is spilled that does not belong to the poor, look on impassively. More than 300 of our peasant brothers, most of them pro-Sandinists, have been killed as a result of feelings of hatred and revenge. Many of the victims were innocent children.

In 1992, Nicaragua grew in hunger, unemployment, extreme poverty, beggarliness, social violence, revenge, egotism, and disdain. In Nicaragua, the attitude of surrender grew because of those who dedicate themselves to blocking foreign aid; those who offered international organizations more than those organizations were demanding; and those who exchanged public posts for funds.

Those who in the name of change are trying to install in Nicaragua some sort of Somozism without Somoza, tried throughout the year to push for opportunism, servility, administrative corruption, and a base fatherland and have tried to make these negative factors appear legitimate. It is true that there are more show windows and more lights in Managua, but taxes grew faster and the young and the unemployed are desperately walking the streets and stand at traffic lights and sidewalks. Nicaragua is changing, but in what direction, we ask.

The year 1992 was a year of oppression and repression. The government often favored the use of force over dialogue and negotiations. The workers, however, have not been intimidated. They have known how to struggle for their rights and the dignity of the people.

In 1992 the peasants, the workers in the cities and in the countryside, the people from neighborhoods and settlements, the women, the students, the retired officers, the mothers of war victims, the disabled war veterans, the demobilized resistance veterans, the unemployed, and the people from the indigenous regions of the north and south Atlantic, all these sectors found themselves forced to protest in the streets, on roads, at farms, in factories, in schools, and in health centers. All of them participated in civil protests that included prolonged fasting periods.

The year 1992 was full of natural disasters, such as the eruption of the Cerro Negro volcano and the tidal wave, and the people again displayed their generosity and solidarity. The year was full of huge difficulties and economic limitations for all Nicaraguans.

The year 1993 should unite us with a brotherly spirit so that we can really start building stability, which is an essential factor for social and economic development, and that Nicaragua can change with jobs, health, education, security for everyone's property, and the drafting and full implementation of the Autonomy Law for the North Atlantic and South Atlantic Autonomous Regions.

The coming year should allow the fulfillment of all the agreements made by the government at different negotiating tables. In 1993, we must witness the solution of the property dispute with guarantees for the legitimate rights granted to all Nicaraguan citizens by Laws 85, 86, and 88. Furthermore, all those who experienced expropriation and have not received fair compensation, should also be indemnified. However, the Somozists should receive no more property than that which has already been returned. It is urgent to modify the economic policies in 1993 so that all of society has the opportunity to incorporate the productive process and enjoy its benefits. A clear position must be taken by the government with regard to not putting more workers on the unemployment list with the pretext of reducing public spending.

The National Assembly, Executive Branch, Judicial Branch, and the Electoral Branch must be strengthened in 1993 so that the institutions, the Constitution, and the laws of the republic are the basis of the state rights.

We Sandinists are always open to dialogue and we believe all national agreements involve a social economic agreement. That is why it is urgent that the great builders of the economy, such as workers, producers, technicians, professionals, and businessmen, commit themselves to solving the property problem and supporting a new economic policy which must be undertaken by the government to bring stability to the whole nation.

The coming year will be the year of the struggle for stability and the year that must take all Nicaraguan homes to the recovery of faith and hope so that together we may forge the economic, social, and political development that Ruben Dario and Augusto Cesar Sandino dreamt for our fatherland.

Free Fatherland or Death.
[Signed] Daniel Ortega Saavedra; Managua, 31 December 1992, on the eve of 1993.

Panama

Foreign Minister Reports on Extradition Requests

PA0501211693 Panama City Telemetro Television Network in Spanish 1730 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Panamanian Foreign Minister Julio Linares has said Panama has not had any positive results in the requests for the extradition of civilians and soldiers of the previous regime. The foreign minister made the statement while commenting on the case of Lieutenant Adonai Gallardo who is charged with destabilization.

[Begin Linares recording] With respect to the departure of Mr. Gallardo, we have nothing new on that, and as the saying goes: The ball is in the court of the tribunals of justice or in the Attorney General's Office. They are the ones who should ask us to request the extradition, should they consider it appropriate. You and all of us Panamanians... [pauses] because extradition is a subject that evidently causes great interest but we must be aware of something. Once a government requests the extradition, that issue rests with the government to which that request was made. We, the state that requests the extradition, can do nothing more. The matter corresponds then exclusively to the state to which the request has been made. That is the situation now.

We cannot do much more, except for a few diplomatic moves to expedite the process of extradition and to see if there will be a favorable solution to our petition. However, that is all we can do. First of all, in the majority of the countries, the extraditions are processed by the tribunals of justice. It has always been said that, by nature, the tribunals of justice move slowly. That is the first thing. Then, in the second place, we must admit that just as the Latin American states basically give great importance to the right of asylum when they should give it to extradition, they then, unfortunately, adopt a stand that is completely opposed.

One explanation is that perhaps the states want to excessively protect any person who can be considered a person who is being politically persecuted. In our specific case, there are situations of certain persons who, although there are certain political circumstances, they are being persecuted for common crimes and the extradition requests have not been favored. [end recording]

EEC Tariff Not To Affect Local Growers

PA0501185293 Panama City CRITICA LIBRE in Spanish 5 Jan 93 pp 28, 40

[Report by Arnulfo Mendoza]

[Text] Agricultural Development Minister Cesar Pereira Burgos stated the Panamanian banana industry would not have any difficulties despite the customs tariff recently imposed by the EEC, as three of the companies involved in producing this product are from the United States.

Minister Burgos said there are two reasons why the Panamanian banana industry will not have any problems with the EEC decision. Panama has not speculated on the amount of banana sowed, and production has remained between 40 and 45 million boxes. In addition, it is the best banana in Central America.

Based on these facts, Minister Burgos stated the companies involved in this sector would ensure production remains active. In this respect, he predicted the market would remain active as the independent banana growing companies normally sell their products to foreign transnationals established in Panama, which in turn market 80 percent of the banana crop to the United States, and only 20 percent to Europe.

He also stated the government's current concern is out of solidarity with the rest of the banana producing companies. The minister added that "what is questionable" is when everyone continues to call on the less developed countries to remove their trade barriers only to find the wealthy and more developed countries establishing their own barriers.

On the other hand, local observers pointed out that when the EEC announced the increase in custom tariffs on Latin American banana producing countries, an urgent meeting called by Colombian President Cesar Gaviria was rescheduled for an earlier date. However, it is unknown if said meeting ever took place, the decisions adopted, or if it had been postponed for a future date.

Official Notes Consequences of Possible Embargo

PA0501193293 Panama City LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA in Spanish 5 Jan 93 p 32

[Report by Esperanza Navarro Francoises]

[Text] Due to changes in its fishing policies, Panama might be placed under embargo by the U.S. Government this month, according to Roy Cardoze, director general of Marine Resources of the Commerce and Industries Ministry.

Cardoze said the embargo, of which he was notified by the U.S. Embassy, could seriously affect Panama if it is extended to species such as shrimp and lobsters.

The notification, which has not been officially confirmed, results from the fact that fishermen kill dolphins while catching yellow-fin tuna. Dolphins are protected by U.S. conservationist associations.

Cardoze said that in 1990 an embargo was placed on Panama because dolphins were being killed in the tuna fishing process. He said the measure was lifted when Panama subscribed to the "dolphin self" [name as published] program that banned the killing of dolphins.

According to Cardoze, as a member of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Panama has an established mortality quota of 135 dolphins per year.

Cardoze said that if the embargo is applied, Panama could lose some 100 million balboas in foreign exchange.

"We will try to find a way for Panama to solve this problem without hurting the people who work in this industry," Cardoze said.

Industrialists Comment on Need for Consensus

PA0501223693 Panama City LA PRENSA in Spanish 5 Jan 93 p 12A

["Viewpoints" column by the Association of Panamanian Industrialists: "Need for Consensus"]

[Text] In a speech delivered on 15 December 1992 before the American Chamber of Commerce, His Excellency U.S. Ambassador Deane R. Hinton recalled Edmund Burke, the British speaker and illustrious statesman, who at the close of the 18th century said that "every government, even all benefits and human pleasure, all virtues and prudent actions, are based on transactions. We place the inconveniences on a balance; we give and we receive; we give back some rights in order to enjoy others."

As a recognition to the importance of the search for a national objective by consensus, product of that transaction, Ambassador Hinton took the Civic Crusade as an example and added:

"(Burke) spoke of the need for a consensus, of reaching a basic agreement within the government and society, so that the work of the nation could advance. Panamanians who favored democracy over the dictatorship forged that consensus in the struggle against the military regime. And it had such force! The respect for the rights and ideas of others, faith in democracy as the best form of government, and the determination to make personal sacrifices for the sake of society are the tools for building a consensus, and the construction of a consensus is the motor for national progress."

This is exemplary, coherent, and pragmatic reasoning by one who ponders more on the search of what can unite us, rather than praise what can divide us because, as he said, "the construction of a consensus is the motor for national progress."

Obstacles are encountered today trying to achieve that consensus based on transaction. We understand the misgivings of those who were never with the crusade or those who were against it, but we cannot understand it from others.

An example of praising the conflict is found in MIPPETAS [pamphlet issued by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy] No. 27: "Can a political agreement achieve a program of liberation?" For the author, an important government official who has been in several administrations, the consensus is "a form of defending the interests of those who benefit from or support the status quo." However, he goes beyond all attempts to wake up and consider that we are in another society when he says: "An agreement could be the condition necessary for the implementation of an economic program, particularly where there is a weak government or one without the political willingness to lead a change process."

Bolivia

UK Secretary of State for Latin America Visits

PY0501203693 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1629 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] The British Embassy in La Paz has confirmed that Tristan Garel-Jones, British secretary of state for Latin American affairs, arrived today in Bolivia for an official visit.

Garel-Jones, who is the first British secretary of state for Latin American affairs to visit Bolivia, will go today to Chapare Region, which is the main area for coca leaf production, in Bolivia's central valleys. Coca leaf is the raw material for processing cocaine.

Projects designed to provide potable water to the underprivileged are being implemented in Chapare with the financial support of the United Kingdom. Chapare is at the headwaters of the Amazon region.

Bolivia is the world's No. 2 coca producer, after Peru. The Bolivian Government is implementing an alternative development program designed to replace coca with other crops, despite the discouraging experiences it has had so far.

Garel-Jones will return to La Paz tonight. Tomorrow he will meet with President Jaime Paz Zamora, Vice President Luis Ossio, Foreign Minister Ronald MacLean, and other cabinet members.

Garel-Jones and Bolivian Government officials will sign an agreement to forgive a portion of the $74 million Bolivian debt, as part of the agreements made during the meeting of the Paris Consultative Group.

Strike Called by COB Partially Observed

PY0601115693 La Paz Television Nacional Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 6 Jan 93

[Excerpts] The government has officially evaluated the strike staged today. Information Minister Jose Luis Lupo today assessed the strike called by the COB [Bolivian Labor Federation] and public transport workers, and evaluated the situation nationwide.

After analyzing official reports from principal government officials—including the interior minister, the police chief, and the labor and finance ministers—about the main aspects of the 24-hour strike, he said that the situation was normal. Activities in banks, industry, and the textile industry were normal. This strike would have not been of real significance if public transport workers had not have joined it. He said:

[Begin recording, unidentified reporter] Reports from Santa Cruz state that activities were almost normal. Public transport workers fully observed the strike in Cochabamba and Oruro. Activities were completely normal in Tarija except for the university. The strike was partially observed in the rest of the country. [end recording] [passage omitted]

As a result of the strike declared by the COB a series of incidents occurred; the most significant occurring in El Alto where an administration office was seriously damaged, several people were injured, and about 100 people were arrested.

Brazil

Health Minister Installs New Fiocruz President

PY0601004493 Brasilia Voz do Brasil Network in Portuguese 2100 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Summary] Health Minister Jamil Haddad installed Carlos Morel as the new president of the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation [Fiocruz]. Morel was one of three individuals elected by Fiocruz officials in 1989, but was not considered by the previous government. Morel, a doctor born in Pernambuco, plans to increase the production of medicines and other pharmaceutical products to reduce the prices of medicines sold to the people. He said that Fiocruz can produce 90 percent of the 280 products considered essential.

Freire Views Franco Meeting With Party Leaders

PY0601015793 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 4 Jan 93 p 4

[Text] Deputy Roberto Freire (PPS-Pe) [People's Socialist Party-Pernambuco], the government leader in the Chamber of Deputies, said the meeting between President Itamar Franco and the political parties' leaders scheduled for 8 January will not be for negotiating projects. "The meeting will be only to exchange ideas and strengthen the commitment for governability," Freire said, worried about an eventual failure of negotiations between the government and the parties. "Each and any negotiation should be made within Congress," he added.

Freire's assertion contradicts the statement made by Planning and Finance Minister Paulo Haddad, who on 2 January admitted the possibility of modifying the plan of goals prepared by his team for the purpose of using suggestions made by the party leaders. The meeting, "an unusual fact," according to Freire, will allow the government to learn whether the political parties will continue cooperating.

"It will be a formal confirmation of the partnership created while Itamar was interim president and which allowed Congress to approve the new salary law and the new personal income tax law," Freire said. Freire, who is in Florianopolis to attend the swearing-in ceremony of Mayor-elect Sergio Grando, stressed that no important decisions will be made during the meeting. "No minimum government program will be decided during that meeting," he said.

PSDB President Reports on Political Pact

PY0601120193 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 4 Jan 93 p 4

[Excerpt] Brasilia—PSDB [Brazilian Social Democracy Party] president Tasso Jereissati, one of the creators of the pact between the political parties and Itamar Franco's administration, yesterday asserted that the objective of the pact is not to obtain unconditional support for the president, but to allow the approval of specific projects for a determined period of time. Tasso Jereissati said: "After the measures are approved each one can go his own way," adding: "The government already has a defined position, and some people will remain with the government while others will pass to the opposition."

He said that the idea of a political understanding sprung from the realization that it would be difficult to overcome the economic and social crisis. He added that, contrary to previous attempts to reach an understanding, the situation is now more plausible because the government will determine the priorities it wants to discuss with the parties which, in turn, will provide congressional support for the measures proposed by Itamar and seek the people's support.

"It must surely be possible for the same group of politicians who united to overthrow a corrupt president to now unite to give governability to the country in order to solve our chronic problems," Tasso Jereissati said. He stated that the parties should demonstrate the same ability and lack of selfishness they showed to approve the impeachment of former President Fernando Collor to now deal with the national problems. "We cannot turn our backs on the millions of Brazilians who are dying of hunger," he said.

Tasso Jereissati and Worker's Party President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva are waiting for the government, through Planning Minister Paulo Haddad, to present the points of priority for the negotiation with the parties. This first meeting that will take place on 8 January in the Granja do Torto in Brasilia. [passage omitted]

Seven Governors Support Franco Administration

PY0601020693 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 2200 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Seven governors went to Planalto Palace to voice their support for the governability pact. They also submitted to President Itamar Franco a proposal to create 2 million jobs in the civilian construction area.

During the three-hour meeting, the governors from the northeastern part of the country and Minas Gerais discussed with Franco the implementation of the integrated tourist development project. In the presence of the governors, Franco made a telephone call to the Inter-American Development Bank management to guarantee until July the allocation of $600 million for the project. The states will provide $600 million, and the federal government will be in charge of evaluating the project.

The main objective is to create a tourist infrastructure and build highways, hotels, and airports. The governors want to turn the states' foreign debt into tourist investments.

The governors took the opportunity to submit a proposal on the creation of 2 million jobs through the construction of 400,000 houses. The project's funds would be obtained from the pension funds that must assign 5 percent to the housing sector in accordance with the law—but they do not do so, and from the saving accounts of private banks that prefer to invest in more profitable sectors.

The Federal Savings Bank alone channels all savings resources for the housing area. At the meeting's end, the governors held a news conference in which they guaranteed their full support for Itamar Franco's government. Maranhao Governor Edison Lobao stated:

[Begin Edison recording] As a governor I am obviously interested that the president of the Republic has all the political conditions to govern the country, and I am ready to help him. [end recording]

* Tales of Torture Under Military Regime Related

* The Decision To Speak

93SM0085A Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 18 Nov 92 pp 20-21

[Article by Expedito Filho: "An Autopsy of the Shadows"]

[Text] Marival Dias Chaves do Canto, 45, is dark-skinned, muscular, and in good shape for his age. Born in Bahia State, he lived for many years in Sao Paulo and now owns a modest-size business in Vitoria, Espirito Santo State. From a distance, he looks like anyone else. From close up, there are some peculiarities. Chaves, as he is known, is tense and used to repressing his emotions. He speaks in a jargon that is a mix of police and political terms. Words such as "subversives," used to refer to the militants of Leftist organizations, or "element," when he refers to just anyone, frequently pop up in his vocabulary. Last week, Chaves ended a long series of interviews with VEJA. The pages of his narrative reveal that he is far from being a serene citizen. He is the first former agent of the Army's intelligence units to tell everything he knows, including terrible and illuminating details of the barbarity in the cellars during the leaden years of the military dictatorship.

For more than a decade, the former Sergeant Chaves has been mulling over a decision to speak out. While he was still frequenting the belly of the beast, going in and out of the torture dungeons and spending hours reading testimony from political prisoners, Chaves made a point of memorizing and taking notes on details. Last month, he concluded that the move to impeach President Fernando Collor had changed this country, especially the Armed Forces, who had remained within the realm of legality, as mere spectators at the crisis. He decided to tell all. Two weeks ago, he called his wife and daughters, ages 16 and 18, together to tell them for the first time that he had been

part of the military repression apparatus. At first, they were terrified. Later, emotionally touched. One of his daughters had taken to the streets to demand the ouster of Collor, helping swell the ranks of painted faces and reminding people of the rebellious years; only later did she learn that her father had been an active participant in that period. "My family thinks it was important to tell everything so that we can rewrite that part of history," Chaves said.

Visit to the Bridge

The former noncommissioned officer's dramatic tale of life and death in the cellars is not as chronologically comprehensive as the 20 years of dictatorship, much less does it carry the weight of an account by someone who coordinated the activities and could therefore give an overall view of the subject. A dirty, silent war began to rage in Brazil after President Joao Goulart was overthrown in 1964. It was less violent than the war in Argentina, during which about 10,000 people disappeared. But the cycle of the dictatorship in Brazil mobilized 13,000 militants from the left, distributed among 29 organizations that took up arms and another 22 that opted for so-called peaceful resistance. On the other side of the trenches were 400 military men who were directly involved in covert operations. During these clashes, terrorists robbed banks, kidnapped, and murdered. Those on the other side arrested people illegally, tortured, and killed. In all, more than 4,600 people were stripped of their political rights, about 10,000 were exiled, and the list of those who "disappeared" contains 144 names.

Chaves' testimony is only a partial report. Its importance lies in the fact that it shows us the routine of political repression from the inside, for the first time. Being cautious, the former sergeant spoke only about what he is sure of and kept quiet when he had doubts. Last Friday afternoon, he even flew to Sao Paulo and drove along the SP255 highway, which provides access to the city of Avare in the interior of that state. There are two bridges there. Chaves wanted to see them to figure out which had been used to throw the bodies of murdered prisoners into the river. He is satisfied now that he has gotten this off his chest. "It was the top military brass who helped themselves to appointments and jobs during the era of the repression," he said. "The silent majority wanted the Army to be professional, like it is today."

Chaves insists that while in the cellars, he never tortured anyone or was involved directly with murders or the hiding of bodies. "If I had done that, I would not be giving this interview," he says. His assignment was to evaluate the depositions taken from the prisoners and compare them with information that had been passed on to the Army by leftist militants who had been converted to informers. In 1965, he entered the Army and worked at the War Arsenal in Sao Paulo. Three years later, by then a noncommissioned officer, he had his first contact with intelligence activities. "We found out that Captain Carlos Lamarca's People's Revolutionary Vanguard was painting a truck with Armed Forces colors to use in a terrorist action," Chaves recalled. After taking courses in jungle warfare, Chaves joined the Intelligence Operations Detachment, the DOI [expansion as published], headed by Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra. Thus he began his fellowship with the cellar.

Letter of Resignation

The former Sergeant Chaves worked at the Sao Paulo DOI until 1976. From there he moved to Imperatriz, in Maranhao State, where he served in a Jungle Infantry Battalion. From Imperatriz he passed through Manaus, until detailed to serve in Brasilia in the Planalto Military Command in 1980. The following year, Chaves moved on to the Army Intelligence Center, which commanded the cellar operations. It was during that period that he was assigned to handle security for then-dictator of Argentina Leopoldo Galtieri, during his visit to Brazil. In 1985, he made a most unusual decision for someone in military service. Through normal bureaucratic channels, he forwarded a letter resigning from the Army. "It was tough. I spent many sleepless nights roaming around the house until I decided I could no longer stand that pressure," he said. When he resigned, he gave up a military career extending more than 20 years and lost all the benefits military personnel get when they transfer to the reserve. If he had stayed, he would now be a captain. Today, Chaves is an ex-sergeant, but has the advantage that he cannot be punished for his disclosures.

* Interview With Former Sergeant

93SM0085B Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 18 Nov 92 pp 22-32

[Highlights of interview by VEJA editor Expedito Filho with former Army sergeant Marival Dias Chaves do Canto; place and date not given; first paragraph is VEJA introduction]

[Text] It was a year ago that VEJA editor Expedito Filho first talked with Marival Dias Chaves do Canto, who spent 17 years as an agent in the Domestic Operations Detachment (DOI-Codi) in Sao Paulo, and at the Army Intelligence Center in Brasilia. Three weeks ago, Chaves, who specialized in intelligence analysis, finally decided to tell all he knows about the arrest, torture, murder, and disappearance of the bodies of political prisoners. The interview went on for more than 20 hours, and the main parts of it are published on the following pages.

[Expedito Filho] How were the political prisoners killed?

[Chaves] I know that in Sao Paulo, some died from torture. Those who survived were liquidated by the agents of political repression with an injection of the kind used to kill horses weighing up to 500 kg. The injection was given intravenously, so the political prisoner died instantly. Anyone who has ever witnessed one of these scenes knows it is one of the most grotesque and repugnant things you can do to a human being. They killed and dismembered. Agents who were at a house maintained by the Army Intelligence Center in Petropolis, Rio de Janeiro State, told

me how the bodies were dismembered, sometimes cut up into as many as 14 pieces, like cattle at a slaughterhouse. It was a terrible business. They did this to make it harder to find and identify the deceased. Each cut-off limb was put in a bag and buried at a different site. The house in Petropolis was where the Army Intelligence Center killed most of its prisoners and hid the bodies. Militants arrested in various parts of the country were sent directly to Petropolis from the outlying states.

[Expedito Filho] How many houses of torture and death did the Army Intelligence Center maintain?

[Chaves] From the end of the 1960's until the early 1970's there was a house in the Sao Conrado neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro. Later, for security reasons, the center of torture and death was moved to Petropolis. That was where they sent the prisoners who had been sentenced to death, but some managed to survive. In 1972, the Second Army in Sao Paulo set up its clandestine torture and murder centers. For a short time, the Intelligence Operations Detachment (DOI) used a country house in the southern zone of Sao Paulo. Murdered there were Antonio Bicalho Lana and his companion Sonia Moraes, both members of the National Liberating Action, the ALN.

[Expedito Filho] But the official story is that Lana and Sonia died during a shootout.

[Chaves] That is a lie. They were tortured, and murdered by shots to the chest, head, and ears. The bodies were put in the trunk of a car and taken to Santo Amaro, a neighborhood in the southern zone of Sao Paulo. Then, a farcical shootout was staged to simulate their deaths.

[Expedito Filho] After abandoning that country house, did the Intelligence Operations Detachment open another in Sao Paulo?

[Chaves] Yes. That was a period of feverish activity in terms of killings. At the end of 1973, the DOI used a house in Ipiranga in Sao Paulo's southern zone. During that period it sent up another secret center on the Itapevi highway. Between 1965 and 1966, a nightclub known as Kerosene operated there. It belonged to the brother of Sublieutenant Carlos, founder of Operation Bandeirantes (OBAN). But in 1975, for security reasons, the Itapevi jail was replaced by a ranch alongside the Castello Branco highway, 30 km from Sao Paulo. The ranch was owned by a friend of Army Major Andre Leite Pereira Filho.

[Expedito Filho] How were the killing centers equipped?

[Chaves] They had the same things as a regular house would, in addition to the equipment used in the repression. The Ipiranga and Itapevi houses even had fetters to chain prisoners' hands and feet to the beds and to cement blocks.

[Expedito Filho] Was hiding the bodies an improvised operation, or was there some plan?

[Chaves] Killing subversives was a highly professional activity. At the houses in Sao Paulo, there was a team that specialized in hiding bodies. The agents knew exactly what to do. First, they cut off the phalanges of the fingers to keep the bodies from being recognized from their fingerprints. Then they tied the legs behind the body to reduce its size by half, and they slit the stomach with a knife. This was to prevent the body from eventually coming to the surface after being thrown into a river. They would also put the body in a bag and tie it to a cement slab weighing 40 or 50 kg, to insure that the body would stay at the bottom of the river.

[Expedito Filho] There are tens of families who still do not know where to find their relatives' bodies. Do you have any idea where they were buried?

[Chaves] Yes. A good number of the bodies are not underground, but under water. If someone were to search the river under a bridge on the road that connects the city of Avare in the interior of Sao Paulo State to the Castello Branco highway they might find a lot of bodies. There is a regular cemetery under the water there.

[Expedito Filho] Can you name some of the "disappeared" who are in the river at Avare?

[Chaves] I know the names of eight, all from the Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party, the former PCB. A good number of them fell into the hands of the repression during Operation Radar.

[Expedito Filho] What was Operation Radar?

[Chaves] It was a major Army offensive begun in 1973 to decimate the PCB. Operation Radar culminated with the seizure of the printshop used by the PCB's newspaper, VOZ OPERARIA [Voice of the Worker].

[Expedito Filho] Was it during that operation that some of the PCB's Central Committee were captured?

[Chaves] Yes, and then thrown into the river at Avare. That is what happened to Hiram de Lima Pereira, who had been interrogated at Itapevi, and Luis Inacio Maranhao Filho, arrested in Sao Paulo in 1974. After being taken to Itapevi, Maranhao Filho died from an injection used to kill horses. Joao Massena Melo is another one. He is also in the river, and died from the same kind of injection. Orlando Bonfim Junior, a member of the top echelon of the PCB, is in the river at Avare. Bonfim was arrested in Rio by the Intelligence Operations Detachment from Sao Paulo and taken to the jail on Castello Branco highway. Someone else who is in that river is Elson Costa, who was murdered in 1975. He had been in charge of the party's agitation and propaganda section. He was interrogated for 20 days at the house in Itapevi and subjected to every kind of torture and barbarity. His body was burned. They poured alcohol over him and set it on fire. Afterward, Elson also got the horse-killing injection. Itair Jose Veloso's body was also thrown off the bridge. He had been arrested in Rio, by the Sao Paulo DOI. That was in the winter of 1974. It was an ice-water bath that killed him. He died of thermal shock.

[Expedito Filho] Why did the Sao Paulo DOI arrest people in Rio?

[Chaves] During Operation Radar, the Sao Paulo DOI started conducting a series of operations in Rio in an absolutely secret and illegal manner. Rio was not within the jurisdiction of the Sao Paulo DOI.

[Expedito Filho] What kind of rivalry was there between the intelligence units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force?

[Chaves] There was a great deal of rivalry between the Army Intelligence Center and the Navy Intelligence Center, known as Cenimar. The Air Force Intelligence and Security Center, CISA, eventually joined the Army in a campaign against the Navy's spies. That was a big mess.

[Expedito Filho] Going back to the river at Avare. You referred to eight names, but told us about only six.

[Chaves] One of them was Jayme Amorim de Miranda, also arrested during Operation Radar in one of the Sao Paulo DOI's invasions of Rio. He was transferred to Itapevi. His brother Nilson Miranda, PCB general secretary in Porto Alegre, was imprisoned at Ipiranga. Neither knew where the other was. Nilson survived. The last body to be thrown off the bridge was that of Jose Montenegro de Lima, but that is a special case.

[Expedito Filho] Why special?

[Chaves] Because it shows that a band of thieves also existed inside the agencies of repression. Shortly after the raid on the VOZ OPERARIA printshop, Montenegro received $60,000 from the party to rebuild the structure needed to print the newspaper. A team from DOI caught Montenegro, killed him with the injection, and then went to his house to get the $60,000. The money was parceled out among the top echelon of the DOI.

[Expedito Filho] So far you have been talking about people who were arrested in Rio and taken to Sao Paulo. Were people also moved in the opposite direction?

[Chaves] Yes. That is what happened to Issami Okano, of the ALN, and Walter de Souza Ribeiro, of the PCB. Others who died in Petropolis were David Capistrano (father of David Capistrano Filho, the PT [Workers Party] candidate for mayor of Santos), and Jose Romam. Both were from the PCB. Major Brand headed the team that caught them. Capistrano was taken to Rio. Both were killed at Petropolis, where the practice of hiding the bodies involved dismemberment. That was also what happened to Ana Rosa Kucinski and her husband, Wilson Silva. They were fingered by a "dog," arrested in Sao Paulo, and taken to the house in Petropolis. I think their bodies were also cut up in pieces.

[Expedito Filho] What were the so-called "dogs"?

[Chaves] That is the word we used for the spies, the militants from leftist groups who collaborated with the repression by informing on their organizations' plans and fingering their colleagues.

[Expedito Filho] Did you handle the "dogs"?

[Chaves] No. My job was to analyze the intelligence data. I read the statements taken under torture from political prisoners, and examined the information sent by our plants in the PCB, the ALN, the PC do B [Communist Party of Brazil] and the VAR-Palmares [Revolutionary Armed Guard-Palmares]. I also collected data, did investigations, surveillance, and wiretapping. The one who handled the "dogs" was an officer. We had "Doctor Patricio" and "Doctor Jairo," whom I only know by their code names.

[Expedito Filho] Did you meet any of the spies?

[Chaves] I met several. Severino Teodoro de Mello of the PCB, Joao Henrique Ferreira de Carvalho, or "Jota," from the ALN. I also got to know three spies from the PC do B: Luciano Rosa de Siqueira, the attorney Hamilton de Franca, and Fiuza de Mello, a doctor. All of them worked for the Army.

[Expedito Filho] How were those militants persuaded to spy for the Army?

[Chaves] There was no standard way. Teodoro de Mello, for example, was arrested in 1974 and taken to Itapevi. From there he was transferred to another jail, in the city of Sao Paulo. After being interrogated, he signed an employment contract and received a sum of money. I do not remember how much.

[Expedito Filho] How was Luciano de Siqueira, of the PC do B, co-opted?

[Chaves] Luciano became a "dog" during an operation run by the Army Intelligence Center in Pernambuco State, which was trying to dismantle the Popular Action group (AP), and the PC do B itself. He was arrested in that operation, then tortured and became a spy. In 1977, when General Sylvio Frota was dismissed from the Ministry of the Army, the Army Intelligence Center abandoned all the "dogs" and did not reestablish contact with them until 1982. I participated in those renewed contacts, which were headed up by Paulo Malhaes. I did not personally meet with Luciano, but I know he was living in the Janga neighborhood near Olinda, Pernambuco.

[Expedito Filho] What kind of information did the "dogs" pass on?

[Chaves] Luciano Siqueira carried out several assignments. He was the one who made possible the arrest of a lot of AP and PC do B people in the Northeast. In 1982, when the PC do B was running candidates for federal deputy under the PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party] banner, he made detailed reports on those meetings. When he was in Sao Paulo attending party meetings he was handled by Col. Enio da Silveira. Now Teodoro de Mello, of the PCB, was the one who cleared up a series of questions during Operation Radar. He helped identify a lot of people whom we had known only by their aliases. That was how we found out they were important people in the party leadership. Mello was a turning point. Using his information, it became possible to arrest, torture, and murder several communists.

[Expedito Filho] Did the CIE [Army Intelligence Center] give the "dogs" any kind of protection?

[Chaves] Of course. Sometimes even the comrades of the dogs benefitted from it. I will give you an example. Alanir Cardoso, a former political prisoner, still maintains that Luciano Siqueira was not a spy because he did not reveal that he had a scheduled a meeting with Alanir for the day after his arrest. Problem is, had we arrested Alanir it would have been obvious that Luciano was an infiltrator.

[Expedito Filho] But was there no direct security for the "dogs"?

[Chaves] There was. In 1975, Teodoro de Mello traveled to Rivera, in Uruguay, accompanied by a team of agents from the Intelligence Operations Detachment headed by Col. Enio Silveira. I had personal contact with Mello during the trip. Had he traveled by himself, he might have had problems with the authorities in the South, since he was being sought everywhere.

[Expedito Filho] Would it not have been more practical to leave Mello in Brazil?

[Chaves] He had to leave the country because at that time the PCB was losing a lot of people to the repression. It was dangerous for him to stay in Brazil. He was an infiltrator from the Intelligence Operations Detachment and could have been arrested by some other agency, like the Navy's Cenimar, or DOPS [Department of Political and Social Order]. In Argentina, he supposedly met up with Armando Ziller, a communist leader and then went to the Soviet Union. In Moscow, he worked as secretary to Luis Carlos Prestes, the party secretary general, and even wrote letters from there to Col. Enio da Silveira, reporting on plans made by Brazilian communist leaders.

[Expedito Filho] Did any "dog" work so well that he could be used as a model?

[Chaves] Yes, Joao Henrique de Carvalho, aka "Jota." He dealt the coup de grace to the ALN and other organizations that had connections to the ALN. For his efforts, Jota was cited by the former National Intelligence School as a model spy.

[Expedito Filho] Did Jota contribute directly to the deaths of some of his comrades?

[Chaves] No doubt about it. Some 20 people were eliminated after he fingered them. He is responsible for the death of Antonio Bicalho Lana and his wife, Sonia Moraes. He also fingered Issami Okano, of the ALN. Starting in 1973, Jota fingered all the ALN commandos. It was due to his work that Wilson Silva and his wife Ana Rosa Kucinski were arrested, tortured, and killed.

[Expedito Filho] Do you have any information about the death of journalist Wladimir Herzog in 1975?

[Chaves] The one who can clear up everything about Herzog's death is Major Andre Leite Pereira Filho. He was chief of the interrogation teams, including the one that killed Herzog.

[Expedito Filho] Do you know the whereabouts of former Deputy Rubens Paiva?

[Chaves] He was taken by a detachment of the First Army to the house in Petropolis, where they killed him. They used the method of cutting the body into pieces and burying it in different places.

[Expedito Filho] But Amilcar Lobo, the Army doctor who usually treated the tortured prisoners, insists he cared for Rubens Paiva at the Army Police headquarters in Rio de Janeiro...

[Chaves] Former guerrilla Ines Etienne has already refuted Amilcar Lobo. He might have seen Rubens Paiva alive at the Army Police headquarters, but he died in Petropolis. Everyone knows Amilcar Lobo took care of the tortured prisoners at the Petropolis house. Besides, there were two people involved in the Rubens Paiva incident: the brothers Jacy and Jurandyr Ochsendorf e Souza.

[Expedito Filho] Is it true that some of those who disappeared were buried on a ranch in Rio Verde, in the interior of Goias State?

[Chaves] Marcio Beck Machado and Maria Augusta Thomaz, both from the Popular Liberation Movement known as Molipo, were killed and buried at a ranch in Rio Verde. Human rights groups came close to finding the place where they were buried, but the Army Intelligence Center found out about their activities and, through Major Leite Pereira, sent a team to disinter the bodies and remove them. The major is the only one who can say where the two are now.

[Expedito Filho] Have a lot of lies been told about the fate of political prisoners?

[Chaves] I do not think there has ever been as much lying or as many atrocities. There are countless examples. The repression apparatus spread the report that Joao Batista Franco Drumond, of the PC do B, had died after being hit by a car. Lies. He died at the Second Army's Department of Intelligence Operations [as published]. He was tortured, escaped the guards, climbed a radio transmission tower, and leaped to his death. Eduardo Leite, of the ALN, was arrested in 1970 by Chief Sergio Paranhos Fleury's team and kept at the Sao Conrado death house. Later he was transferred to Sao Paulo and murdered. They put on a little show to throw people off the track.

[Expedito Filho] What were those little shows?

[Chaves] The dead prisoner was taken to a public place where DOI teams would fake a shootout that supposedly resulted in deaths. When it came time to take the "body" to the IML [the morgue] they substituted the body of the prisoner for the agent who had pretended to have been killed. At the morgue, coroner Harry Shibata and others legalized the death in combat.

[Expedito Filho] Were there no comments among the agents, condemning these killings, or expressing some indignation?

[Chaves] On the contrary. The commentaries were very jingoistic. People cheered when Antonio Bicalho Lana was arrested. There were two kinds of people during the repression. The first were inclined toward killing, inspired by hate. The others had no criminal tendencies, but were imbued with the doctrine of national security. They killed because they believed they were saving the country from communism.

[Expedito Filho] How did you feel about all that?

[Chaves] Very bad. I spent many sleepless nights. But I tried to lead a normal life. I noted down some reports on a sheet of paper and kept thinking about the day when I would tell all. I was cornered, trapped. I had no friends and could not unburden myself by talking to anyone, not even my wife. When I woke up, I faced the same routine. It was a horror.

[Expedito Filho] How did the people who commanded the repression behave? Were they violent people in their daily lives?

[Chaves] Col. Enio da Silveira was extremely violent. To him, the doctrine of national security was above everything else. He had taken courses at all levels of the intelligence field. With those he commanded, he was actually courteous. But when he wanted to be, he was tough and energetic. He committed suicide in 1986. Col. Paulo Malhaes, who was in charge of contacts with the infiltrators, was preaching from the same textbook. He was in Chile, where he interrogated and tortured both Brazilians and Chileans. Then Col. Fred Perdigao, who had belonged to the Army Intelligence Center since the time he was a captain, had enough influence in the cellars to spend his time taking prisoners from Sao Paulo to Petropolis. He took part in the disappearance of Ana Rosa Kucinski and Wilson Silva.

[Expedito Filho] Was there a pact of silence between killers and torturers?

[Chaves] After each case, at lunchtime, and in hotel rooms during trips, the agents would comment on what had happened. The conversations were simulated, and no one specifically said: I killed.

[Expedito Filho] No agent threatened to leave the Army and tell all?

[Chaves] Any guy who tried to withdraw during the repression ran the risk of being executed. One agent, whom I knew only by his code name "Junior," was ousted from the investigations section for trying to extort money from journalist Bernardo Kucinski, brother of Ana, in exchange for information on her whereabouts. The investigation section considered executing him because he said he would go to the Commission of Justice and Peace in Sao Paulo to denounce certain things about subversion.

[Expedito Filho] Why did you decide to talk?

[Chaves] The activities of the battle against subversion gradually started making me sick, I was nauseous, vomiting, everything you can imagine. I saw things happening, did not agree with them, but could not speak up. The disciplinary rules in the Army were very strict. There still existed the general rule of action that barred a member of the intelligence unit from expressing his own opinion or questioning an order. If someone failed to carry out an order, there were punishments and then, afterward, he would be labeled as being against the Revolution of 1964. I was not educated for that kind of activity. I was co-opted and by the time I woke up, I was involved. The system itself tried to compromise those who were involved. There was tremendous fear of the repression apparatus. They created symbols right there in the ranks to show that no one could protest. Killing Captain Carlos Lamarca, for example, was a question of honor. That is why, like me, many people ended up staying on, despite dissenting. In 1985, I felt it was time to leave because the military governments had come to an end. It was time to withdraw without compromising myself.

[Expedito Filho] You do not think you compromised yourself?

[Chaves] If I had killed someone I would not be giving this interview. Of course my work—and I acknowledge responsibility for it—contributed a lot to causing those wrongs. There are honest people who took part in the repression but did not agree with that insane violence. But they still do not have the courage to tell what they know, that the only law in the cellars was barbarity.

[Expedito Filho] Do you consider yourself a democrat?

[Chaves] Our country will not be great until it experiences profound democracy. I have been inside the cellars of repression and I know what a bloody dictatorship means. I hope this testimony helps to refine our democracy.

[Expedito Filho] If some human rights defense group asks you to talk about the "disappeared," would you cooperate?

[Chaves] I am ready to help in any way. I want to do a service to my country.

[Box, p 32]

A Research Project For History

The real history of the dirty war between terrorists and sectors of the Armed Forces during the military governments began to be told in 1979, when the first phase of the "Brazil: Never Again" [Brasil: Nunca Mais] project took shape. It gathered the most dramatic testimonies ever given on the actual events in the cellars of the military regime, obtained from unimpeachable sources, and put them on 500 rolls of microfilm. All the narratives came out of 707 case files on political prisoners that were kept in military audit offices, discovered during research that entailed plowing through one million pages of official documents. The project yielded 12 volumes, two of which have been published by Vozes. These books quote from depositions by leftists, identify torturers, and list the names of the "disappeared."

Former sergeant Marival Chaves appears in "Brazil: Never Again," identified as one of those in charge of investigating the VAR-Palmares terrorist group. Chaves made the first volume of that work his bedtime reading. In the margins of each page he pencilled in the names and code names of torturers and political prisoners he knows. One of the people largely responsible for the "Brazil: Never Again" project, Presbyterian minister Jaime Wright, brother of Deputy Paulo Stuart Wright who was murdered in 1973, familiarized himself with details of the interview of the former DOI agent. "This is the first time a former agent of the repression apparatus has decided to tell what he knows, in detail," the pastor observed. "That is of incalculable value to history."

To Paulo Vanuchi, a former militant in the National Liberation Alliance and another of the key people responsible for "Brazil: Never Again," the interview may provide new clues to families who do not know what happened to their dead. "It is an impressive account," he said. Vanuchi thinks that on the basis of Chaves's deposition, the Sao Paulo Mayor's Commission on the Disappeared, coordinated by Suzana Lisboa and Ivan Seixas, may request an official search of the rivers into which Chaves says the bodies of several of the "disappeared" were thrown. "If only one bone is found, that would be a step forward on the road to the truth," Vanuchi said.

* Number of Kidnappings Exceeds 1991 Figures

93SM0099A Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO (City section) in Portuguese 22 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Marita Boos: "Kidnappings Reach 140 and Exceed 1991 Record"]

[Text] Rio de Janeiro—The number of kidnappings in Rio de Janeiro is rising every year. Between January and last Thursday, police recorded 140 cases, or more than the 82 cases recorded during the same period last year—a period that itself had set a new record for kidnappings throughout the state. Considering that many families do not even report kidnappings of their relatives, it is possible that the total is even higher. The director of the Anti-Kidnapping Division (DAS), Police Chief Helio Vigio, claims that he has no statistics on the subject, but according to the latest official information, at least 120 cases had been recorded by the beginning of this month.

Although there are no official statistics, the police say that despite the higher number of cases, it is also true that more victims have been rescued and the payment of ransom thereby avoided. They say that about 70 percent of the cases have been solved, with the perpetrators being arrested and the gangs identified. This year has also seen an increase in the number of criminals killed in rescue operations: 14 so far.

As of yesterday, four individuals were still being held by kidnappers. Of those, the one who has been in captivity the longest is student Marcelo Araujo Quintella, 19. The criminals have been holding him since 12 October. Of the four cases, the one which worries Police Chief Helio Vigio the most is that of four-year-old Erick Richard Mathesson, the grandson of Paul Mathesson, owner of the Ecisa construction firm. Erick was snatched from a school bus as he arrived at his home in Barra de Tijuca on 30 October. And since the 12th of this month, the family of businessman Roberto Fiat has been reliving the drama it experienced about four months ago when the businessman's brother Ricardo was kidnapped. The most recent kidnapping was that of businessman Antonio Correa Barbosa, owner of the Sao Silvestre Transportation Company, who was seized by several armed men on Wednesday.

Gangs—According to the police report, the most active kidnapping gangs are those headed by drug trafficker Adias Ferreira, or "Adao," who runs the drug traffic in the Vigario Geral shantytown in the Northern Zone; Carlos Alberto Fidelis, or "Kaluka," of the Vila Alianca shantytown in Bangu in the Western Zone; and a holdup man identified only as "Genesio" who is active in the Rio de Janeiro Lowlands.

Among the criminals who have been wanted since the kidnapping of advertising executive Roberto Medina in 1990 are Moises Rodrigues de Souza, who belonged to the gang headed by Mauro Luis Goncalves, or "Maurinho" (Goncalves was killed by Federal Police), and Jorge Luis Nascimento, or "Sabonete." Vigio says there are several smaller groups whose distinguishing feature is that they demand lower ransom amounts.

Americans—A source in the Civil Police says the kidnappings have even brought Americans into the picture. According to the police official in question, at least three agencies—Argen Incorporation [as published], Argen American, and Control Risks—have been hired by families of kidnap victims in the upper middle class since the kidnapping of Roberto Medina. They receive a percentage of the original ransom demand, and their job is to reduce the amount of ransom as much as they can.

But those agents do not hamper the investigations, since they usually recommend that all information be passed along to the Brazilian police. The most recent involvement by American agents may have been in connection with the kidnapping of student Ricardo Backheuser, Jr., 23, the son of the owner of Carioca Engineering, on 7 July. He was released one week later. Helio Vigio denies that Americans participated in the negotiations.

* Politicians Organize for April Plebiscite

* Presidentialism Requires Change

93SM0097A Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 22 Nov 92 p 5

[Article by Marta Salomon: "Supporters of Presidential System Attempt To React"]

[Text] Brasilia—Supporters of the parliamentary system got an early start and took the lead in organizing their movement to get that system adopted in the plebiscite scheduled for 21 April 1993. By last week they had set up

the complete structure of their National Parliamentary Front. But now supporters of the presidential system are reacting. Under the coordination of Senator Marco Maciel (PFL [Liberal Front Party], Pernambuco) and heartened by the few members who have signed up in recent weeks, they held their first meeting on Tuesday.

"A little over a month ago, all the presidentialists together would not have filled a Volkswagen," says the senator in explaining his enthusiasm. "Today we can already think about renting a bus." Maciel was able to attract 38 congressmen (less than 10 percent of the total number in Congress) to the meeting by the Presidentialist Front on Tuesday. But he expects to have a total of 90 deputies and 15 senators—a minority compared to the enthusiastic group rooting for the parliamentary system in Congress but a surprising number at a time when the presidentialists seem to be a vanishing species.

After almost suffering a knockout as a result of the crisis in the administration headed by President Fernando Collor, who has been removed from office, the presidentialists have decided to make the impeachment the cornerstone of their campaign to retain the current system of government. "The country has weathered the impeachment episode very well," Maciel argues. Paradoxically, however, the basis of his argument carries its main difficulty within itself: "The presidential system today has become a synonym for Collor."

Changes—To attract votes in the April plebiscite, the leaders of the presidential movement are agreeing to important changes in the system. The first such change is the reduction of the president of the republic's term of office to four years, thus making his election coincide with congressional elections. That would be a way of preventing a new president from being elected without a solid political base guaranteeing him support and so-called governability. Another change in the system would require that ministers of state be approved by the Senate, as happens today in the case of appointments to Brazilian embassies abroad and the appointment of the president of the Central Bank. This was settled in telephone calls between Maciel and the most prominent defender of the presidential system, Rio de Janeiro Governor Leonel Brizola (PDT [Democratic Labor Party]).

Of the potential presidential candidates, Brizola is the only one agreeing to come out in support of retaining the current system of government. Deputy Marcia Cibilis (PDT, Rio de Janeiro) has announced that the governor intends to launch the Leonel Brizola Presidentialist Front in December. Its headquarters will be in Rio de Janeiro. The movement is in keeping with Brizola's desire to be elected president in the 1994 elections, but it is faced with the threat of defections by PDT members themselves. The party's bloc in Congress is split down the middle by the debate over the system of government. The biggest problem, however, is the difficulty involved in sharing the campaign platform with other presidentialists of national importance. "It is complicated for us to work with Antonio Carlos Magalhaes and Orestes Quercia," Maciel admitted.

The president of the PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party] is also reluctant to ally himself with the governor of Bahia and Brizola. Moreover, he is rejected by the other supporters of the presidential system because of his involvement in complaints of illicit enrichment. "He is not going to campaign," say the party leaders in the Chamber of Deputies (Genebaldo Correia of Bahia) and the Senate (Humberto Lucena of Paraiba). They recall that most of the PMDB's members of Congress openly support adoption of the parliamentary system. And they admit that Quercia's candidacy for president of the republic in 1994 will collapse if the parliamentary system wins.

The president of the PT [Workers Party], Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, also has a divided rear guard in Congress. The party leadership is meeting this weekend for a "preelection poll" regarding the April plebiscite. Lula also admits that he may give up his candidacy for president if the parliamentary system is approved.

* Parliamentary Model Sparks Discord

93SM0097B Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 22 Nov 92 p 5

[Article by Pamela Nunes: "Parliamentary Model Sparks First Discord"]

[Text] Brasilia—Completely organized and ready to launch its campaign in December, the National Parliamentary Front is now facing its first problem: which parliamentary model should be adopted in Brazil if that option is victorious in the plebiscite? That debate is dividing the movement: there are those who support the German parliamentary model, in which the president of the republic has practically a decorative role, and those in favor of the French model, in which power is divided between the chief of state and the prime minister.

The first group includes such important congressional leaders as the president of the movement himself, Senator Jose Richa (PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party], Parana), and Deputy Sandra Cavalcanti (PFL [Liberal Front Party], Rio de Janeiro). Lining up with the second group are Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Senator Jarbas Passarinho (PDS [Social Democratic Party], Para).

"I support a mixed solution, in which the president of the republic will have important duties conferred by the Constitution," says Passarinho, who claims to be in a time of transition between the presidential and parliamentary systems. Sandra disagrees: "The German system is more efficient." She feels that the concentration of powers in the hands of the prime minister makes it easier to run the government machinery. Deputies Nelson Jobim (PMDB, Rio Grande do Sul) and Roberto Magalhaes (PFL, Pernambuco) have been put in charge of finding a solution based on consensus. The formula they come up with will take the form of a bill sponsored by the front. Jurist Miguel Reale, Jr., the movement's legal adviser, is working on a survey of all the laws and models concerned with the parliamentary system.

Preparation—Preparations for the campaign are in the final stretch. According to Richa, the movement will rely a great deal on the help of governors and mayors. "In states and large municipalities where the parliamentary system is fully supported, we will not have much difficulty," said Richa. "But in most cases, there is a balance of forces, chiefly in the big urban centers." As an example, he mentioned the situation in Rio de Janeiro, where Governor Leonel Brizola (PDT [Democratic Labor Party]) is an intransigent supporter of the presidential system but where Mayor Marcello Alencar and the mayor-elect, Cesar Maia, are convinced supporters of the parliamentary system and are likely to neutralize Brizola's efforts.

The situation in Sao Paulo is the reverse. Governor Luiz Antonio Fleury Filho supports the parliamentary system and was the first to establish a state front. Mayor-elect Paulo Maluf (PDS) supports the presidential system. Although Maluf has promised to talk to supporters of the parliamentary system after the election, people close to the mayor-elect feel that it will be difficult to convert him.

* Proposals for Both Systems

93SM0097C Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 29 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Helena Chagas and Ricardo Amaral: "Supporters of Parliamentary Government Far From Agreement"]

[Text] Brasilia—With only five months left before the plebiscite that will determine the regime and system of government in Brazil, supporters of the parliamentary system and the presidential system still do not know exactly what they are going to offer the voters in April 1993. There are various proposals for each system, and neither of the groups has been able to decide exactly what it wants.

For example, should we have a parliamentary system with direct or indirect elections for president of the republic? Or a presidential system with one or five presidents? Even the joint congressional committee appointed to unify proposals has concluded that it is faced with a confusing situation.

"Deciding everything now might be unconstitutional. The best thing would be to wait for the constitutional revision following the plebiscite and then work out the details of the model in accordance with the transitional measures adopted by the committee," says Senator Marco Maciel (PFL [Liberal Front Party], Pernambuco), who supports the presidential system.

The committee is faced with a legal mess, according to Maciel and other politicians such as Miro Teixeira (PDT [Democratic Workers Party], Rio de Janeiro), a supporter of the parliamentary system. It would be unconstitutional to approve any legal rules stipulating that systems not yet approved in the plebiscite are to have this or that feature.

The possible solution is an informal political agreement that might be violated during revision of the Constitution. "The side that loses the plebiscite will try to change the winning system in the plenary meeting to bring it closer to the defeated system," predicts Paulo Delgado (PT [Workers Party], Minas Gerais), who supports the parliamentary system.

The subject is becoming taboo for both groups, since disagreements might lead to splits that will end up harming the campaign for adoption of one system or the other. One of the issues causing the most disagreement among supporters of the parliamentary system, for example, is the question of the electoral system to be adopted if the parliamentary system wins. The model followed in most parliamentary countries is that of the majority vote by district, which does not please small parties or those with clear ideological leanings such as the PT.

"A majority vote by district means death for the Left," says Deputy Nilmario Miranda (PT, Minas Gerais), who supports the parliamentary system.

The choice of a system of government may drive Lula's party—already divided—completely out of the Parliamentary Front. Even the rules for the plebiscite have not been adopted. Each side is trying to make the rules work to its own advantage, since "the process will have a big influence on the result," according to Miro Teixeira. Optional voting would theoretically favor the parliamentary system, since its supporters are more mobilized, but the trend is toward retaining compulsory voting in the plebiscite.

Even so, there remains the question of the quorum, which may also favor the parliamentary system if an absolute majority (50 percent plus one of the total number of registered voters) is not required to get the victorious system proclaimed.

Doubts on the Presidential Side

1. President's term of office: four, five, or six years?

2. Presidency of the Republic: should it be individual or collegial, with the presidents being elected from a single slate?

3. Powers of Congress: should it approve the appointment of ministers or not; should its prerogative of halting actions by the executive branch that exceed the latter's power to issue directives be increased or not; and should legislative powers be delegated to the president?

4. Judicial branch: should vetoes by the president of the republic on grounds of unconstitutionality be submitted to the Federal Supreme Court for a ruling?

5. Election: should the president of the republic be elected in one or two rounds of balloting?

6. Electoral system: proportional vote or mixed majority vote by district? And should the rules governing the representativeness of the blocs in the National Congress be amended or not?

Doubts on the Parliamentary Side

1. Election of the president:

a) Direct election in two rounds.
b) Direct election in a single round.
c) Indirect election by Congress.

2. Extent of the system's application:
a) Federal administration only.
b) Federal administration and state governments.
c) Federal administration, with state systems to be chosen by plebiscite.

3. Electoral system:
a) Majority vote by district for the election of deputies.
b) Proportional vote for the election of deputies.
c) Mixed system, with deputies elected by both the above systems.
d) Mixed, with a majority vote by district and deputies representing the nation as a whole.

4. Requirements for being a minister:
a) Prime minister and cabinet to be chosen from among all Brazilians, the only limitation being age.
b) Prime minister and cabinet to be chosen from among elected members of Congress.

5. Role of the Senate:
a) To represent the Union as it currently does.
b) To have responsibility in specific areas of government.
c) To be abolished.

* Ministers Favor Parliamentarism

93SM0097D Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 29 Nov 92 p 3

["Itamar: Parliamentarism's Chief Asset"]

[Text] Brasilia—President Itamar Franco is avoiding direct participation in the campaign for parliamentary government, but he is perhaps the cabinet system's most powerful votegetter. Before becoming president of the republic, Itamar openly expressed his desire to be "the last vice president in history"—an allusion to the fact that such an office does not exist under the parliamentary form of government.

No fewer than 16 of Itamar's ministers belong to the Parliamentary Front. The exceptions are the military ministers, the chiefs of the Civilian and Military Households, the secretary general, and the minister of industry and trade, Jose Eduardo Andrade Vieira.

In Congress, the supporters of parliamentary government are led by Senator Jose Richa (PSDB [Brazilian Social Democracy Party], Parana), the front's president in the place of Ulysses Guimaraes, who died before taking over the post. The front is too broad a group to conceal its internal disagreements—it comprises about 50 members of Congress from all the parties. Besides theoretical questions about the parliamentary model to be adopted, political problems are also dividing the group.

That was the case in Rio de Janeiro, for example, where Deputy Sandra Cavalcanti (PFL [Liberal Front Party]) was irritated by the appointment of her opponent Marcello Alencar to be the movement's regional president. A quarrel typical of the presidential system, comments Deputy Paulo Delgado (PT [Workers Party], Minas Gerais), the movement's membership secretary. Delgado, Jose Genoino, Jose Dirceu, Joao Paulo, and Nilmario Miranda are the system's chief supporters within the PT.

It is more difficult to support the parliamentary system in such parties as the PT, the PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party], and the PDT [Democratic Labor Party], which have already chosen candidates for president of the republic in the 1994 election, according to Deputy Miro Teixeira (PDT, Rio de Janeiro), a supporter of the parliamentary system. But the front has cleverly found a place in those strongholds as well. In the PDT through Miro himself and Mayor Marcello Alencar. And in the PMDB, the party's vice president, Jarbas Vasconcellos, is a member of the front's advisory council along with a group of deputies and senators.

The broad parliamentary alliance includes Itamar's political coordinator in the Senate, Pedro Simon (PMDB, Rio Grande do Sul) and Deputy Israel Pinheiro Filho (no party), shield bearer in Brasilia for Minas Gerais Governor Helio Garcia, who is being courted by both sides. Representatives of Fernando Collor's cabinet (Collor also says he favors the parliamentary system) also belong to the front. Former Minister Jorge Bornhausen, for example, is coordinator of the finance committee.

* Project To Stem Amazon Deforestation Launched

93SM0099B Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 28 Nov 92 p 23

[Article by Eduardo Trece: "Amazon Region Gets Sustained Development Project"]

[Text] Brasilia—Last week the Amazon Region gained one more project aimed at reducing deforestation and environmental deterioration. The site chosen is the municipality of Juruena in Mato Grosso, and the first phase of the project should show results within three years. The Brazilian Institute for Environmental Research and Studies (Pro-Natura) has launched the Juruena Project in order to create choices for utilization of the tropical forest based on sustained development.

Pro-Natura intends to persuade settlers to stop clearing land by burning and to show that the tropical forest can be preserved even when subject to economic exploitation. Juruena has 5,000 inhabitants, and its economy is based on logging. The project is being financed by the British laboratory ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries).

"We want to prove that it is possible to adopt a new system of settlement for the Amazon Region without destroying biodiversity. It will be a program for increasing the awareness of the settlers, and it has financing for 20 years," said the president of Pro-Natura, Marcelo Carvalho de Andrade.

The Juruena Project will use a 100-hectare area for studying trees native to the Amazon Region. About 50 hectares will be set aside for the Experimental Research Center, which will conduct studies for increasing the productivity of the trees. The rest of the area will be turned into a model plantation.

"Pro-Natura intends to teach the settlers to adopt management and cultivation methods that do not harm the forest," said Yucatan Teixeira da Silva, the project's technical manager.

The Juruena Project may come to influence an area of as much as 600,000 hectares in the municipalities of Juruena and Cotriguacu in northern Mato Grosso. Only 4 percent of the territory of that region has been affected by burned-over land or turned into pasture. Over the next few years, Pro-Natura intends to buy a 5,000-hectare area on which to establish a botanical garden.

Juruena was chosen because of the great diversity of species, the meager scientific knowledge of its ecosystems, the lack of government agencies for environmental conservation, strong economic pressure from farming and grazing interests, and the interest shown by local rural producers in new management methods. The project will be monitored by researchers from the Federal University of Mato Grosso and the National Institute for Amazon Region Research (INPA).

Farmers Support Forest Studies

Brasilia—The medium- and long-term results of the Juruena Project are being awaited with great hopes by the settlers. They already know that it will be three years before the community benefits from the results of the project, although the initial results of experiments with native trees in nurseries should be available within one year.

"It is important to begin a project like this to make people aware that clearing land by burning and removing timber from the forest indiscriminately will be bad for the municipality. The project is off to a good start," said farmer Jaco Baches.

Growing Cabbage Palm a Priority

The biggest challenge facing the Juruena Project will be to discover options for profitable crops. The Association of Amazon Region Businessmen and Juruena's municipal government support the step being taken by the Pro-Natura Institute in the hope of developing a management and production system that will stimulate the municipality's economy without harming the environment.

"Juruena has very great potential for growing fruit and perennial crops such as coffee, but it needs an agricultural industry. The project will provide the settlers with efficient methods for managing the tropical forest within just a few years. I hope that the agricultural industry will flourish as a result of the new methods that will be studied," said Juruena's secretary of agriculture, Luiz Maekawa.

Juruena, which was carved out of the municipality of Ari-Puana in 1988, will be able to serve as a model for tropical forest management throughout the Amazon Region, with productivity gains in the various crops that will be studied in the area by this project.

"The project's first concern will be to ascertain the correct management method for growing cabbage palm and other native palms, which may be highly profitable," said Yucatan Teixeira.

All the profits from the project will be used to continue research, and the patents on any medicines that are discovered will be registered in the name of the municipality's union of rural producers, who will pay royalties to the Juruena Project.

* Flores Sees Scenario for Military Intervention

93SM0113A Sao Paulo VISAO in Portuguese 2 Dec 92 pp 12-15

["Excerpts" from interview with Admiral Mario Cesar Flores, secretary of strategic affairs, by Armando Ourique, in Brasilia; date not given: "The Risks of Democracy"]

[Text] Admiral Mario Cesar Flores, secretary of strategic affairs, warns that in a situation of extreme social difficulty, the people may take to the streets and demand intervention by the Armed Forces.

The social situation in Brazil has reached the point of extreme seriousness. The democratic regime needs to show that it can successfully solve such problems as the rise in unemployment and the abandoned state of health care. Otherwise the day will come when, in the face of worse difficulties, the people may be desperate enough to take to the streets and demand the return of the military.

That is the fear of the secretary of strategic affairs of the Presidency, Adm. Mario Cesar Flores. In an interview granted to VISAO in his office at Planalto Palace, Flores, who was minister of navy in President Fernando Collor's administration, asserts that the top military hierarchy is strongly committed to democracy. But he emphasizes that that is not enough to ensure constitutional stability. Anywhere in the world, democracy needs to be capable of retaining the people's confidence in its operation and its ability to find the solution to serious social problems. He says that he can imagine the top military hierarchy stepping outside the institutional bounds only if it is pushed in that direction by the people themselves.

Flores' ideas on military intervention during the republican period are detailed in his book *Bases para uma politica militar (Bases for a Military Policy)*, which will be published in December by the Unicamp (Campinas University) publishing house. Here are the main excerpts from the interview granted to Armando Ourique.

[Ourique] For some time now, Brazil has been trying unsuccessfully to solve extremely short-term problems while the social and economic situation is deteriorating.

Do you feel that a continuation of that kind of failure may jeopardize institutional stability?

[Flores] I consider it a valid idea that failure by the democratic system to solve the people's problems may lead to instability. I do not believe that we have already reached that point. Brazil is a country of such plenty that despite the difficulties it is experiencing, it has not yet reached the point where hope has collapsed. But the idea is valid. If solutions are not forthcoming within months, or at least if there is no hope of solutions in the near future, it may happen that the distrust and despair with respect to the institutions which the people already feel will increase. When that happens, the situation will be ripe for risky ventures. I do not mean that those ventures will necessarily be military. Hitler's rise to power was an almost natural consequence of the German people's loss of hope with respect to the democratic system of the Weimar Republic. Then we had the apocalypse that was the Nazi regime.

[Ourique] Do you believe that our country can solve its problems through democratic mechanisms?

[Flores] I believe it is more possible in Brazil than in countries where there are tremendous difficulties in living. Brazil has a physical structure, an economic infrastructure, and a fair amount of industrial capacity enabling it to resume its development with less difficulty than, for example, most African countries. So the path to the democratic system is viable in Brazil. It is not blocked. But a number of steps need to be taken.

[Ourique] It is also the best path, right?

[Flores] It is more sure than salvation movements. In the long run it is more sure. In the short term, those exceptional movements generally produce some immediate result. But they do not last. They do not extend to all of society. So the surest path and the one that comes closest to satisfying all the people is really the path of democratic agreement. We must want to stay on that path and do our best to stay there.

[Ourique] What bottlenecks do you identify as preventing the democratic regime from being effective in solving the serious economic and social problems facing the country?

[Flores] I would say that the first thing is that the Brazilian state needs to get back into a position to manage government policies. The Brazilian state is on the verge of bankruptcy. This obviously requires a reformulation of the tax issue. I do not know whether that is exactly the proposal now before Congress, because the matter is too technical for me. But we need something that will give the Brazilian state a net balance enabling it to pursue government policies in the areas of transportation, energy, education, and health, which may be the most important social issue in the short term. The second thing would be an improvement in the rules of political representation—basically a reform of political parties and election rules. We need electoral and party legislation that will facilitate nationwide representativeness. There is already consensus on that.

[Ourique] Is it not true that one of the problems with the functioning of democratic institutions today arises from the need to learn democratic practices following a period of military rule?

[Flores] No doubt about it. The features of political life during 21 years of military government inhibited the emergence of great national political leaders. There are not many national leaders between the ages of 40 and 60 years—the age group that was formed politically during the period of military rule.

[Ourique] What is your assessment of the seriousness of national problems such as unemployment, poverty, the condition of the roads, inflation, the outbreaks of minor social conflicts, and other problems that may be causing you concern?

[Flores] I feel that we are at a stage of risk that must not grow worse. The country has the strength to put up with this level of difficulty a little longer. But we need to halt the increase in difficulties. Measures of a government or business nature to prevent [as published; presumably stimulate intended] an increase in employment, for example, are essential. We also need government and business measures to halt the degeneration of health care. It is not possible for public health care to get worse. It has already reached the limit of extreme seriousness. We have reached the bottom of the well when it comes to acquiescence. It must be stopped. I feel that this is happening. I feel that there cannot be any magic improvement. But I also feel that we are managing to hold on, and if the National Congress provides an answer in the form of some kind of tax reform, I have the impression that the improvement will be immediate. At least we will be in a position where we can have hope. And the people will live better just by the fact of having hope.

[Ourique] You have been warning of the possibility that in response to the worsening economic and social situation, the people may call for military intervention. Could you explain the scenario for that risk in detail?

[Flores] The risk exists in theory. It is not Brazilian, nor is it a phenomenon of the moment. It is a risk that has always existed throughout history. Because when the people fall into the rhythm of despair, they look for life preservers that I would call heterodox. But I do not see that happening in Brazil at the moment. I feel that there is still time to improve things. My intention is to point out that the possibility is not implausible. It is a possibility that may become fact.

[Ourique] If the situation reaches the point where it endangers national security—if the country is in danger of falling apart—how would the top military hierarchy react?

[Flores] I believe that at present, the military are not likely to violate the rules of the constitutional game unless they are pressured into it by society itself. In other words, there is no possibility of military action without society's approval. I feel that the experience with military rule, the undissipated heat from that experience, and the difficulties being experienced by the Armed Forces—largely as a

consequence of the period of military rule—mean that there is a lot more caution today about making incursions into the political arena. What I know about the military, or at least those that I associate with, meaning the top hierarchy, enables me to say that leaving the constitutional path is an extremely remote possibility. I can imagine such a possibility only if the military were pushed into it by the people themselves. Things like the people taking to the streets to demand a military presence or something like that. In that case it might happen, since the Armed Forces are sensitive to the voice of the people. But that is a long way from happening. In my opinion, what prevails very strongly today is a military desire to see the rules of the game obeyed. So I feel that such an eventuality is possible in theory but very unlikely in practice.

[Ourique] But how would a process leading to intervention work? If we have a problem with escalating inflation or the distribution of essential goods....

[Flores] No. That is not the way it would happen. There may be rising inflation and physical difficulty in distributing essential goods....

[Ourique] And the people would take to the streets and call for exceptional measures?

[Flores] Well, that could happen. It would be necessary for the people to take to the streets and call for exceptional measures, and it would have to happen nationwide. There is no way that an isolated instance would justify it. I do not believe we will reach that point. Because before that happens, steps will be taken to meet those minimum needs of the people. But you know, this is not a national problem. My God, it is a worldwide problem. If the conditions exist for the loss of control over public life, the tendency to adopt exceptional measures is not a Brazilian failing. Our Constitution provides that the Armed Forces may act to preserve law and order if called upon to do so by one of the branches of government. In other words, what cannot exist is military autonomy in the matter! There is already a complementary law regulating that article of the Constitution—Complementary Law No. 069/91—and it even spells out how the process is to take place.

[Ourique] Admiral, we are talking about two kinds of military intervention. One is in response to a local problem. The other is the kind you mentioned: the establishment of a state of exception which may relieve a tense situation in the very short term, is that right?

[Flores] Yes. It is as I told you: a strong nationwide outcry would be necessary, because the military are not favorably disposed toward that kind of reaction at present. So I would say that getting to that point would require an earthquake.

[Ourique] Are you afraid of the possibility that a local social conflict in one large city might spread to the rest of Brazil?

[Flores] There are a number of Brazilian cities which have a very strong influence on the others. Rio de Janeiro is the main one. Perhaps because it used to be the capital or because it is a city that has always attracted the attention of Brazilians. So I would say that if localized events occurred in cities that have an influence on the rest of the country, they might be imitated in other places. There was that disturbance in Rio de Janeiro, and a few days later there was also one in Fortaleza—this is symptomatic. If it had not occurred in Rio, it probably would not have occurred in Fortaleza, either.

[Ourique] Is the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, which you head, monitoring that problem?

[Flores] No. My secretariat is the result of a merger between the former Secretariat of National Security and what was left of the former SNI (National Intelligence Service). What used to be the Secretariat of National Security operates more or less as it always has. What used to be the SNI is now reduced to the Intelligence Department. And it does what the word says: it looks into things and makes analyses. For example, we have analyses of tensions on the agrarian issue. Occasionally it produces an analysis of an area subject to severe tension, such as that in southern Maranhao. Things like that are monitored, but only for purposes of analysis. There are no further operations.

[Ourique] Did your secretariat monitor the case of the disturbance in Rio de Janeiro?

[Flores] No. We looked into it later. What good is the analysis we made? It serves mainly to help the authorities make decisions and prioritize resources.

[Ourique] You say that the Armed Forces would consider military intervention only if there were a public outcry. But is that statement valid only as long as hierarchical control is maintained in the Armed Forces?

[Flores] When hierarchical control functions smoothly, the probability of military actions in violation of the rules is much smaller. Because it is age, experience, and the accumulation of life experiences that make people more moderate. Human nature is the same among the military as it is in civilian life. So the probability of political intervention by senior personnel is much smaller. It is a good thing that the hierarchical structure is given special treatment. Giving the hierarchical structure special treatment is a guarantee that the constitutional rules will be obeyed.

[Ourique] How is the military hierarchy given special treatment?

[Flores] Mainly by seeing to it that military matters and matters of interest to the military as a social entity—an example being the pay issue—flow through the hierarchy. In that way, respect on the part of those further down in the hierarchy establishes itself naturally. What is wrong is to try to defeat that process through alleged representation. The military are represented through the hierarchy; anything other than that is poppycock.

[Ourique] In order to preserve control by the military hierarchy, is it necessary to deal with the pay demands forwarded by the top hierarchy?

[Flores] The top hierarchy must be able to see to it that everyone else understands that what needs to be taken care of is in fact being taken care of. But it is not easy to make a captain understand why he must earn X when a congressional adviser earns three times X. That is a dangerous thing.

[Ourique] How displeased are the captains and majors not only with the pay issue but also with the situation in the country?

[Flores] I left the Navy almost two months ago, but I have the impression that while there is dissatisfaction with pay, things are calm politically. I am an admiral in the reserve, and I can tell you that my gross pay is on the order of 16 million cruzeiros. I am in the top post, and someone on active service earns only 300,000 or 400,000 cruzeiros more. So it is obvious that military pay is not keeping pace with the cost of living. But as far as I know, there is no political unrest. The pay equality introduced at the end of the Collor administration left distortions, as Minister Paulo Haddad has been saying. Many steps remain to be taken to solve the problem of equal pay. The civilians working on the job classification plan are in a worse situation than the military. Those people are in a shameful position.

[Ourique] Is there a new version of the hard line? People nostalgic for the military period?

[Flores] No. I think that is so much poppycock. I am very familiar with the Navy. It certainly does not exist in the Navy.

[Ourique] Are the military committed to democracy?

[Flores] As an entity, they are certainly committed to democracy. Individually, there may be people who think differently, but they have no voice: they are in no position to act hegemonically. Those that are in a position of professional hegemony are committed to the democratic system.

[Ourique] Joao Manuel Cardoso de Mello, a professor at Unicamp, is pessimistic. He feels that inflation is going to rise again at the start of the year and that in general, the problems will not be solved. He is afraid that the end result of the deteriorating national framework will be military intervention, as you have been warning.

[Flores] That would be an extreme result. But it is not likely to happen. In conversations among senior military men, the question sometimes comes up. But there has not been a single case in recent years where I have heard anyone not say the same thing: "Look, guys, only if we are pushed, otherwise, no." The military will have to be pushed into it by the people, otherwise no. In other words, that is now the consensus.

[Ourique] What comments do you have concerning the testimony by former Sergeant Marival Dias Chaves do Canto regarding the atrocities committed by the parallel repressive organizations operated by the Armed Forces during the military regime?

[Flores] I do not know how much truth there is in those reports. I never served in that area. But I feel that Brazil is experiencing a national crisis in which it is better not to open up wounds that have barely healed. Someday history will have to delve deeply into the whole matter. But I sincerely feel that this is the wrong time to stir up coals that are cooling. We are in such a difficult period already, and are we going add more trouble in such a difficult period?

[Ourique] Because it increases the risk of military intervention?

[Flores] I do not think it has anything to do with that risk. It has to do with the stirring up of animosities.

[Ourique] Is the fact that a military regime leads to the emergence of repressive organizations not one more reason to try to prevent it from taking power again?

[Flores] A military regime does not necessarily require that. We have had examples in the world of military governments without that kind of system. I do not think the two things necessarily go together. I do not want a military regime because I prefer to see democracy work. Not because a military regime may give rise to a repressive organization. Repressive organizations can exist under civilian governments. The repressive machinery under Getulio Vargas' government was extraordinary. The German Gestapo was a civilian institution, and the German Army was the Gestapo's victim.

[Ourique] Which military regime has not had a strong organization for repression?

[Flores] They have always had repressive organizations, but sometimes openly—their own. The Army itself, not a parallel organization. The Argentine regime of 1976, for example. It did not create a parallel system. It was the Army itself.

[Ourique] But there was more torture there than here. Argentina has 10,000 "disappeared ones."

[Flores] No doubt about it. But that was the Army itself. In our system, the traditional organizations were very marginally involved, but there they were directly involved.

[Ourique] But when you get right down to it, there is no military regime that has not used repression.

[Flores] That is logical. If there is no need for repression, why should there be a military? It makes no sense.

[Ourique] You mean "be" in the sense of being the government?

[Flores] Yes.

* Contract To Buy Bolivian Natural Gas Discussed

93SM0099C Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL in Portuguese 1 Dec 92 p 12

[Article by Fabio Alves: "Brazil and Bolivia Confirm Signing of Contract on 17 February 1993"]

[Text] Sao Paulo—The date set for signing the final contract between Brazil and Bolivia for the importation of natural gas beginning in 1995—17 February 1993—has been confirmed to this newspaper by the Bolivian ambassador to Brazil, Angel Zannier, and by the national assistant secretary of energy, Eugenio Mancini.

"The Brazilian and Bolivian delegations are working diligently on the technical aspects of the contract to ensure that the deadlines will be met," he said. According to him, his country's secretary of energy and hydrocarbons, Hugo Peredo, was in Rio de Janeiro recently and met with Petrobras experts to confirm that date.

Deposed President Fernando Collor signed the preliminary contract with the Bolivians for gas imports on 17 August of this year [1992]. The final contract, to be signed after 180 days, was to cover the importation of 8 million cubic meters of natural gas per day beginning in 1995 and of 16 million cubic meters per day beginning in 2002. The contract will be signed by Bolivian Government Oil Deposits (YPFB) and Petrobras, and the latter is to sign individual supply contracts with the six states that will receive the Bolivian gas under the "take-or-pay" system.

According to the president of the Association of State Natural Gas Distributors (Abegas), Luiz Appolonio Neto, Petrobras has not yet started negotiating to sign the contracts with the states involved in the importation of Bolivian gas: Sao Paulo, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Parana, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. "We are working against the clock. The distributing firms are ready to sit down and discuss the contracts with Petrobras," he said. "Abegas is very concerned about the delay by Petrobras in negotiating the signing of the contracts, because just under three months remain before the signing of the final contract between Petrobras and the YPFB."

Secretary Mancini said there was adequate time for signing the contracts between the states and Petrobras. "That is a desirable step, but it is not essential to the signing of the final contract between the two countries," he said. He announced that the Ministry of Mines and Energy would hold a meeting with the states and Petrobras within the next few days for the purpose of trying to reach a formal agreement between the parties to make the gas imports feasible.

In the opinion of the director-president of the Parana Energy Company (Copel), Francisco Gomide, a few important matters need to be resolved before contract negotiations between Petrobras and the states begin. "At present, the only condition the states are aware of concerns the gas supply quotas—that is, the volume to be allocated to each state," he said. According to him, it is necessary to set the price of the gas and establish the supply terms, including the timetable for delivery of the fuel.

"To determine the price of the Bolivian gas, it will first be necessary to determine the cost of constructing the gas pipeline that will carry it and decide who—the government or private enterprise—will be responsible for building that pipeline," he said. Gomide feels that the timetable for negotiating the contracts between Petrobras and the states is too tight. "Fewer than three months remain before the signing of the final contract, and Petrobras has still not sent us a detailed draft of the contract to be signed by the states," he reported. He feels that the changes in the Brazilian political situation may have upset those negotiations.

Chile

Government To Defend Fruit Growers Rights

PY0601012893 Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] The Chilean Government will defend, to the end, the rights, which have been violated by a U.S. lower court ruling, of the fruit growers affected by the case of cyanide-laced grapes.

This statement was made at La Moneda Palace by Foreign Minister Enrique Silva Cimma after an almost three-hour meeting with President Patricio Aylwin during which they discussed various issues, among them the Rio Group meeting to be held this year in Santiago, its agenda, and the preliminary meetings. They also discussed the Foreign Ministry's organic law draft.

[Begin Silva Cimma recording] Regarding the poisoned grapes case, I can tell you that the government is assessing this issue with great interest. It is a complex issue with a series of juridical, political, and economic aspects in which the government's stance must be taken into account. Moreover, I already have summoned [Association of Chilean Exporters President] (Ronald) Bown for a meeting on 8 January to talk about the case they lost due merely to a lower court ruling they can still appeal. [end recording]

Silva Cimma said the government is studying the problem exhaustively and added that it is unlikely a decision on what steps will be taken will be reached this week:

[Begin Silva Cimma recording] The president wants to exhaustively study this case and has asked me for all documents related to the case, which is plentiful, so I think it would be hasty to say a decision will be made this week. [end recording]

Minister Silva was asked whether the government intends to defend the Chilean position to the last resort. He briefly answered this question:

[Begin Silva Cimma recording] That is a correct deduction. [end recording]

Silva Cimma ended by stating that the government's decision regarding this problem might be made next week. According to observers, the chief of state will make a decision after studying all the data on the case.

Government Recognizes Palestinian Representative

PY0601004193 Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] According to the Foreign Ministry, the government has recognized the Palestinian Information Office in Chile.

By means of an official communique, the Foreign Ministry states that the aforementioned Palestinian office will be headed by PLO official (Husayn Abdel Kaleb).

The communique states that the Chilean Government has thus fulfilled the Palestinian committee's desire to have an information office that, undoubtedly, will act as a bond with the fatherland of their ancestors.

The Foreign Ministry communique ends by reiterating the Chilean Government's concern with the Middle East situation, as well as its commitment to the search for a peaceful solution to the Palestinian issue within the framework of the UN resolutions and its hope that the dialogue started by the involved parties in Madrid will be successful.

Defense Minister Says Quality Not Quantity

PY0501155093 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1000 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Excerpts] Defense Minister Patricio Rojas has stated that when budgeting military expenses, quality is more important than quantity. [passage omitted]

[Begin Rojas recording] The modern way of thinking, with regard to military expenditure, is to replace quantity with quality. We cannot overlook this if want to be the modern country we believe we are, a country at the leading edge of world events both in economic and international spheres and also in the military field. [end recording]

Rojas said this during a ceremony at which Major General Luis Henriquez Riffo, the departing chief of staff, passed his command to Admiral Jorge Arancibia Reyes. [passage omitted]

Rojas later met with his Malaysian counterpart bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak Mohamed Najib, who has come to further Armed Forces cooperation and to learn about Chilean military industry with a view to signing cooperation agreements.

Colombia

DAS Assumes Custody of Captured EPL Leader

PA0601022293 Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 2300 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Report by Jorge Koura]

[Text] Humberto Callejas, one of the top leaders of the dissident Popular Liberation Army, EPL, was transferred—under heavy escort and following two days' of questioning—from the regional Attorney General's Office to the Administrative Department of Security, DAS, cells in Barranquilla.

Callejas was arrested on Saturday, 2 January, and the authorities identify him as the number two man in the EPL. He has spent 16 of the last 24 hours in the regional Attorney General's office. The number two EPL leader is under the 2d Brigade's authority and he will remain here, until his legal situation is settled. Callejas' defense was assumed on 5 January by Rafael Barrio Mendivil, replacing Anunciacion Albornoz, a court appointed lawyer.

A communique was issued this afternoon by the Hope, Peace, and Liberty Movement, asking [EPL leader] Francisco Caraballo to reconsider his warmongering position and begin peace negotiations with the national government.

[Begin unidentified speaker recording] I urge them to reflect, particularly Francisco Caraballo. He should reflect and give proof of political wisdom by accepting a peace process. I am sure the Colombian people will thank him. [end recording]

Investigation Reveals Money Laundering Operation

PA0601043493 Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 2300 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] The Superintendency of Foreign Exchange Controls has detected a huge money laundering operation after four years of investigations. The illegal operation was carried out by false textile exporters with the complicity of a bank manager. Carlos Julio Betancur has the report.

[Betancur] According to the Foreign Exchange Superintendent Mauricio Rodriguez, the investigation revealed the operation was actually a cover-up for money laundering. This case closed another chapter of fictitious exports and led to the arrest of 40 Colombians, who, through nonexistent textile exports to the United States and with the complicity of the manager of a branch office of the Banco de Occidente in Barranquilla, managed to launder more than $42 million.

[Begin Rodriguez recording] Those individuals used citizen identification card numbers belonging to deceased persons, street vendors, or persons whose documents had been stolen. They opened bank accounts and laundered the money through those accounts. [end recording]

[Betancur] The individuals involved in the operation took advantage of the weakness of previous laws, which only required an export license to remit the money to Colombia.

The applicable fines total 29 billion pesos.

[Begin Rodriguez recording] We initially inquired about the industrial and commercial activities of the alleged exporters and found out they were nonexistent. We then

conducted investigations with Customs authorities and confirmed no transactions had been made for the alleged exports. [end recording]

Half of the individuals implicated in the case currently are at large, including the bank manager. The case is now in the hands of the Prosecutor General's Office, which will establish the corresponding punishment.

The Foreign Exchange Superintendency is currently conducting investigations on fictitious and overcharged exports for $1 billion.

Peru

Fujimori Named 'Constitutional Chief of State'

PA0601011193 Lima Global de Television Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 6 Jan 93

[Text] During its evening session, the Democratic Constituent Congress [CCD] approved, by a majority, a bill submitted by Carlos Torres y Torres Lara declaring Alberto Fujimori Fujimori the constitutional chief of state. In addition, the CCD ratified that the 1979 Constitution and the decrees issued by the emergency and national reconstruction government remain in effect until Congress changes them.

Government To Summon Former Generals to Trial

PA0501163693 Paris AFP in Spanish 1538 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Lima, 5 Jan (AFP)—On 5 January, the Peruvian Government authorized that former Generals Luis Cisneros and Alberto Arciniegas be summoned to trial as their recent statements against the commander general of the Army were considered offensive to the nation and the Armed Forces.

Two decrees signed by Defense Minister General Victor Malca and published in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE announced that the two men will be summoned to a court martial.

Arciniegas and Cisneros—the latter a former interior and war minister in previous administrations—criticized General Nicolas de Bari Hermoza, commander of the Armed Forces Joint Command and commander general of the Army, and said he was "a disruptive factor" who "had lost the trust of his subordinates."

General Arciniega Seeks Asylum

PA0501164993 Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network in Spanish 1635 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Retired Army General Alberto Arciniega has sought asylum at the Argentine Embassy in Lima. Arciniega sought asylum after the government decided to bring charges against him for statements published by a local newspaper on 31 December 1992.

Economy Minister Carlos Bolona Resigns

PA0501161993 Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] We hereby reiterate the exclusive announcement made by Dennis Vargas a minutes ago after holding a conversation with the now former Economy Minister Carlos Bolona Behr. According to what Bolona has told the Radio Programas staff, he has resigned due to important differences in the Economy Ministry.

The media is waiting for the name of the person who will replace Carlos Bolona Behr.

It was learned there were differences among several members of the cabinet and even with President Alberto Fujimori. Therefore, the economy minister has presented his resignation and it, according to statements from Bolona himself, has been accepted by President of the Republic Alberto Fujimori.

Economy, Transportation Ministers Resign

PA0601010993 Lima Global de Television Network in Spanish 2359 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] After confirming that Economy Minister Carlos Bolona and Alfredo Ross Antezana, the transportation, communications, housing, and construction minister, had resigned, Oscar de la Puente, president of the Council of Ministers, announced that President Fujimori would swear in the new economy minister on 6 January.

De la Puente clarified that there was no ministerial crisis. He said the president had evaluated the situation and decided that a reordering of the cabinet was necessary. De la Puente added that Bolona and Ross Antezana had been advised of the change accordingly:

[Begin De la Puente recording] The president evaluated each ministry and considered that the country's political advancement made it necessary to make changes in the ministries of economy and finance and transportation, communication, housing, and construction.

I informed Ministers Bolona and Ross of the President's decision and of the need to establish a mechanism to make the transition to the new cabinet members with the customary cordiality and amid absolute cohesion....

[Unidentified reporters, interrupting] [questions indistinct]

[De la Puente] On 6 January, the president will announce the name of the new economy minister, and probably next week—after I return from Chile—you will know the name of the new transportation minister.

Those actions have not been dismissals, censure, or loss of trust, but have been prompted by the need to reorder the cabinet taking into account that one of the most important factors the government and the parliament will have to confront shortly is the necessary reinforcement of measures to invigorate the productive and social sectors. [end recording]

Rebels, Policemen Killed in Attack on Police

PA0601010293 Lima Global de Television Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 6 Jan 93

[All figures as heard]

[Text] Three dead and two wounded are the result of an attack on a police post at Nuevo Progreso in Tocache. Jorge Caico, our correspondent in Tingo Maria, reported that the attack occurred on the morning of 5 January. Four policemen, eight terrorists, and a civilian were killed in this attack, an attack that was repelled by the police.

The wounded, who were evacuated to the Tocache hospital, included policemen and civilians. The police agents killed in this terrorist attack were: Jose Maria Arias, Roger Sultahuacaya, Raul Matos Romero, and Percy Atuguman Romero.

Venezuela

Interior Minister Resigns; Resuffle Begins

PA0501180093 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 1715 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Excerpt] Caracas, 5 Jan (NOTIMEX)—Venezuelan Interior Minister Luis Pinerua resigned on 5 January, thus initiating a reshuffle. This reshuffle will place the cabinet of President Carlos Andres Perez in preparation for the presidential elections in December.

According to news reports, Perez will make changes in the Information Ministry, in the Secretariat of the Presidency, and in the Office of the Governor of the Federal District, among others.

Interior Ministry spokesman Jose Villasana has told NOTIMEX that Pinerua placed his post at the disposal of President Perez on 4 January and the person who will replace him will be appointed in the next few hours. [passage omitted]

Former Ambassador Urges President To Resign

PA0501191093 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1654 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Caracas, 5 Jan (EFE)—Vladimir Gessen, Venezuelan ambassador to Canada and leader of the New Democratic Generation (NGD) Party, has resigned and requested that President Carlos Andres Perez also resign because, in his opinion, "the people clearly voted against the government."

In a letter made public on 5 January in Caracas, Gessen demanded President Perez resign. According to the liberal leader, the Venezuelan people "demanded a rectification in the recent elections" (held on 6 December 1992).

On 6 December, Venezuela held elections for governors, city mayors, and council members. The majority of the posts were won by the Social Christian parties in the opposition, namely the Social Christian Party, (Copei); the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS); and Radical Cause (Causa R).

Gessen added these electoral results will be reflected in the next leadership elected in Congress, which has two chambers: The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

The Congress of Venezuela is chaired by the president of the Senate, who is traditionally a member of the ruling Democratic Action (AD), and its vice president is the leader of the Chamber of Deputies, traditionally from the main opposition party, the Social Christian Copei.

The leader of the NGD announced his party, which has three deputies in the Chamber of Deputies and formerly supported the government, will vote with the Copei faction, which means the opposition will now have a majority in the leadership.

"Once the new congressional leadership is elected, President Perez will have to make the decision to resign, as his share of a sacrifice to safeguard freedom and normalize the political crisis of the country," he emphasized.

Gessen warned the conditions and causes that generated the coupist attempts of 4 February and 27 November 1992, as well as the people's protest of 27 February 1989 against the increase in gasoline prices and the neoliberal policy, have not disappeared.

President Meets With German Economic Official

PA0501200793 Caracas Venezolana de Television Network in Spanish 2350 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] German Economic Parliamentary Secretary Edhl Riedl visited Miraflores Presidential Palace on 4 January and emphasized that his country is interested in the possibility of increasing German-Venezuelan relations, most of all in oil and extra heavy crude issues.

After meeting with President Carlos Andres Perez, the German official pointed out that both countries are convinced that international cooperation will contribute to improve the economic growth of Germany, as well as Venenzuela. He also asserted Venezuela is currently embarking on an appropriate course in the country's economic policies. In addition, the significant growth in 1992 makes Venezuela a very trustworthy partner.

[Begin Edhl Riedl recording, in German with superimposed Spanish translation] There is positive reception towards [word indistinct] the perspectives of economic cooperation between Venezuela and Germany in the future. The president made reference to Venezuela's crude oil policies and indicated there is interest in long term cooperation with Europe and most of all with Germany. [end recording]

Guyana

Board Reports Highest Gold Output Since 1913

FL0501180593 Bridgetown CANA in English 1704 GMT 5 Jan 93

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, Jan 5, CANA—Guyana's output of 79,582 ounces of gold last year was the highest since 1913, the state Guyana Gold Board (GGB) reported here Tuesday. The 1992 official declaration was worth U.S.27 million dollars. It fell just short of the 80,000-ounce target the gold board had set for the year by 418 ounces.

The state-owned CHRONICLE newspaper quoted gold board general manager, Rupert Foster as saying the declaration was "exceedingly fair" despite the shortfall. Foster said 1992 was a "good year" with collection being the best since the 1913/1914 figure of 82,706 ounces.

Patrick Perreira, president of the Guyana Gold and Diamond Miners Association (GGDMA), said the association's target of 100,000 was achieved, but was blocked by logistical problems.

"We believe that a production of 100,000 ounces was met for 1992, but for logistical reasons, this gold could not reach the GGB," Perreira told the newspaper.

Miners extracting gold in Guyana's gold-rich interior have to travel hundreds of miles through densely forested and over often dangerous and poorly maintained roads to sell their production to the gold board. Some in extremely remote areas have to pay costly air charters.

The board purchased 10,132 ounces of gold in December, one of its best declarations ever. The board has set a 100 000-ounce target this year.

This could be surpassed with production from Omai Gold Mines Limited, a tripartite venture between two Canadian mining companies and the Guyana Government, beginning in earnest this year. The government will rake in 5 per cent of the 250,000 ounces of gold expected to be extracted by Cambior Inc., of Montreal and Golden Star Resources Limited of Edmonton, Canada when production gets into full gear this year.

Gold is Guyana's third largest foreign exchange earner after sugar and rice.